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Preface 
Microfinance is one oft the most successful tools of development policy. Nevertheless, there is a consider-
able gap between demand and supply in microfinance. Demand for microcredits cannot be satisfied by for-
mal and semi-formal suppliers. This also holds true for Sri Lanka, even though many microfinance institu-
tions there supply credits. This gap is closed by informal credit suppliers in Sri Lanka. However, the credit 
supply of informal financial actors such as moneylenders and ROSCAs is inadequate because credit condi-
tions are unfavourable. Moneylenders, for example, charge very high interest rates compared with suppliers 
from the formal or semi-formal financial sector, and moneylenders sometimes adopt illegal practices. 
Despite the important role of informal credit suppliers for microfinance, they have until now been the subject 
of very little research in Sri Lanka. Clearly, it is very difficult to approach informal credit suppliers, par-
ticularly moneylenders. Nevertheless, our research team managed to conduct a number of interviews with the 
two most important informal suppliers of credit: moneylenders and ROSCAs. This empirical analysis would 
not have been possible without the support of many persons. 
All members of the team, which consisted of 5 postgraduates taking part in the training programme offered 
by the German Development Institute (GDI) and one GDI economist, are grateful to everyone who supported 
them in preparing and carrying out the study. We would like to thank the German Agency for Technical Co-
operation (GTZ) – particularly Armin Hofmann and Anke Wolf – for their support of the study. We are in 
debt to Mr. P.V. Pathirana, head of the microfinance department of the People’s Bank, and to the staff of the 
People’s Bank working with the GTZ project in Kandy. Thanks are also due to the staff of the People’s Bank 
in Negombo, in particular Mervin Perera, and in Nuwara Eliya, in particular to Mr. Ghanathilake, who 
arranged the majority of our contacts to moneylenders as well as to many ROSCAs. Without these contacts 
we would not have been able to conduct the interviews, because it would have been very difficult to find 
such interviewees. In addition, we are grateful to all of our interview partners in Sri Lanka, especially for 
their willingness to contribute to the study. We would like to thank Tilmann Altenburg who accompanied the 
study in Germany at the GDI and who provided valuable comments. Last but not least, we would like to 
thank Amalie Ellegala, Ifsal Huzandeen, and Mrs. K. W. H. A. N. Someratne for translating these interviews 
from Sinhalese or Tamil into Englisch and for supporting us to analyse the results of our interviews. 
 
 
Bonn, November 2002            Kathrin Berensmann, GDI 
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Informal Financing in Sri Lanka  I
Executive Summary 
Background and Objective of the Study 
In the literature, it is widely recognised that small-
scale enterprises (SSEs) play a vital role in pov-
erty reduction and employment creation in deve l-
oping countries. This also applies for Sri Lanka. 
One of the major development constraints faced 
by SSEs is their lack of access to adequate credit. 
The main research question of this study is there-
fore: How can the access of SSEs to credit be 
improved? 
In Sri Lanka, there is a gap between the credit 
supply of both informal and formal providers of 
credit to SSEs, which use both sources of credit, 
depending on the specific conditions and purposes 
of credit. The Sri Lankan financial system is 
marked by a dualistic structure, i.e. the financial 
sector is characterised by the existence side by 
side of formal and informal financial markets. In 
developing countries such as Sri Lanka this finan-
cial dualism arises because the formal financial 
sector is underdeveloped, a fact which is also 
reflected in an inadequate formal credit supply for 
SSEs, in particular by banks. The informal 
suppliers of credit make up in part for this lack of 
financial services. However, the financial services 
provided by informal suppliers are also inade-
quate. 
Two approaches are suitable to narrow the gap. 
On the one hand, formal actors could adopt the 
strengths of informal actors, to the extent that this 
is possible for them: This is the so-called down-
scaling approach. Informal financial actors have 
certain strengths which formal actors could learn 
from in order to improve their credit supply  for 
SSEs. On the other hand, informal actors could, as 
far as possible, be integrated into the formal system: 
The is the so-called modified upgrading approach. 
Demand: The Unfulfilled Credit Needs of Small-
Scale Enterprises (SSEs) 
The role of SSEs as a source for employment is 
highly significant. Since SSEs operate on a 
labour-intensive basis, they are able to create 
employment. Estimates indicate that microenter-
prises provide work for 20-40 % of Sri Lanka’s 
total labour force. Many people working in the 
SSE sector are poor. Accordingly, promotion of 
SSEs is considered to be an adequate tool of pov-
erty alleviation. Empirical results from other 
studies conducted in Sri Lanka suggest that about 
30 % of SSEs owners are considered poor. 
Three general findings are dominant in the em-
pirical analysis of the credit relations of SSEs. 
First, the SSEs that we interviewed turned out to 
have very diverse financial relations in both the 
formal and the informal sector. Some of our inter-
view partners had only one source of credit, but 
the majority reported having access to three or 
four different sources. Second, many SSEs had 
relations to both formal and informal sources of 
credit at the same time. Third, some SSEs had no 
financial relations at all. 
The wealthier and more formal an SSE, the more 
likely it is that it will have stable relations with 
banks, which are the preferred source of credit for 
the majority of credit needs. The more informal 
the business and the more survival-oriented the 
SSE, the stronger the tendency is to approach 
informal credit suppliers. In general, all SSEs 
have access to a range of different suppliers, 
namely pawnbrokers, family and friends, money-
lenders, ROSCAs and banks. Only highly 
indebted SSEs appear to have a very limited 
supply of credit, and are without much choice. 
Purposes of Loans for SSEs  
In analysing the role of individual credit suppliers, 
we came to the conclusion that the purpose of a 
loan is the most determinative factor. The various 
purposes for which SSEs approach different credit 
suppliers cannot be separated distinctly. However, 
when we look at loans in terms of their purpose 
and their source, we do find some preferences. 
As regards business purposes, different suppliers 
serve needs in three categories: start-ups, working 
capital and investment capital. Start-ups  are 
mainly financed by either family members and 
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friends or by banks. Working capital is the main 
reason cited for taking out a loan. All credit 
suppliers play a role in meeting this need, and 
even do so in an equally important manner. The 
most important condition if a loan is a certain 
flexibility in disbursement. Investment capital is 
borrowed by preference from banks and ROSCAs, 
because these sources are able to provide rela -
tively large sums for planned purposes. Debt 
repayment plays a very important role here. 
Some of the SSEs interviewed were highly 
indebted and suffering from inadequate credit 
relations. 
The Unsatisfied Credit Needs of SSEs  
Even though SSEs have a choice between different 
suppliers, they are often unable to satisfy their finan-
cial needs. On the one hand, informal financial 
actors offer quick and easily accessible credit for the 
short-term. Informal suppliers are more flexible 
concerning collateral requirements than formal 
suppliers. However, the latters’ credit conditions are 
uncertain and their interest rates are high. On the 
other hand, banks offer large long-term credits at 
moderate interest rates. However, transaction costs 
are high and the procedures are time-consuming. In 
addition, banks require formal collateral or guaran-
tors. As a result, there is a need for quick, small and 
short-term credits at moderate interest rates, which 
may be used for liquidity management, working 
capital or emergencies. Moreover, there is the need 
for larger volumes of credit for longer periods, e.g. 
for start-ups or long-term investments. This means 
that both the informal credit supply and the formal 
credit supply need to be improved. 
Supply: The Informal Providers of Credit for 
SSEs 
The informal financial sector plays an important 
role in Sri Lanka. The main actors of the informal 
financial sector are moneylenders and Rotating 
Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs). 
Moneylenders  
Moneylenders are an important source of credit 
for SSEs in Sri Lanka. The main strengths of 
moneylenders must be sought in the areas of 
borrower selection, transaction costs, and quick 
accessibility. Their weaknesses include high 
interest rates, low credit volumes, the relatively 
short-term of their credits and illegal practices 
used to enforce repayment. 
Borrower selection is based on trust and control. 
This appears to be a successful strategy, as 
moneylenders have very low default rates, even 
though their collateral requirements are very low. 
Furthermore, moneylenders’ transaction costs are 
very low. Our findings show that the better a 
client is known, i.e. the higher the trust in a client, 
the lower all three cost components are. 
Accordingly, the lower the trust, the greater the 
need for control, and therefore the costs. Finally, 
the quick accessibility that has been perceived as 
the major strength of moneylenders is offered 
only to trusted clients. New clients have to wait 
until a moneylender has gathered enough infor-
mation on the borrower and / or his collateral. 
Moneylenders charge high interest rates which 
typically vary between 5 % and 15 % per month 
(p.m.). High interest rates are explained in part by 
a lack of competition between moneylenders. 
Moneylenders do not exclusively rely on their 
own personal funds, and they may borrow from 
banks or use a ROSCA fund for on-lending pur-
poses. Nevertheless, most moneylenders perceive 
their lack of funds as a major constraint. 
Rotating Savings and Credit Associations 
(ROSCAs) 
ROSCAs are an important source of credit for SSEs 
in Sri Lanka. One of the strengths of ROSCAs is 
the personal knowledge and trustful relationship 
that exists between members and organisers. 
Furthermore, the transaction costs of ROSCAs are 
low. The weaknesses of ROSCAs include their 
lack of legal means of enforcement and their 
inability to provide long-term credits. The study 
did not confirm the assumption that the predeter-
mined order of distribution of ROSCA funds leads 
to inflexibility. 
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Many small-scale entrepreneurs participate in one 
or more ROSCAs for credit purposes. They are 
willing to pay a high interest rate and bid high 
sums to obtain the fund. Others use ROSCAs for 
saving, a service that banks do not offer on 
equally favourable terms. One factor that was 
frequently mentioned as an advantage is the disci-
pline required to save in a ROSCA. 
Principle Findings and Policy Recommendations 
The present analysis has shown that one of the 
reasons why the credit needs of SSEs in Sri Lanka 
are not adequately met is the gap between formal 
and informal credit suppliers. The dualistic struc-
ture of the Sri Lankan financial system is charac-
terised by an inadequate credit supply of the 
formal and informal financial actors to SSEs. 
Two approaches would be appropriate to improve 
the quality of credit access for SSEs: downscaling 
and modified upgrading. Since this gap between 
the formal and the informal financial sectors 
cannot be closed on the basis one of these 
approaches alone, a bridge has to be built from 
both sides, aimed at meeting in the middle and 
integrating the two sectors, or, in other words, 
what is called for is a combination of a down-
scaling approach and a modified upgrading 
approach. The result would be a less strict 
division between the formal and informal markets. 
In addition, this would mean more competition 
between different suppliers. The answer to our 
research question is that adequate access to credit 
for SSEs in Sri Lanka can be improved only 
through more competition between the suppliers 
in an integrated financial system. 
Downscaling of banks implies that banks enlarge 
their target group to include smaller clients who 
mainly obtain their credits from informal 
suppliers. In this way banks could adopt some of 
the strengths of informal credit suppliers. First, 
banks could reduce costs by simplifying proce-
dures for small loans without leaving the formal 
framework. Second, like moneylenders, banks 
could accept a wider range of collateral because 
SSEs are often without the collateral required to 
obtain bank credits. 
Third, bank officers could approach customers in 
what is known as the so-called “Field Officer 
Approach,” which is used in the Rural Banking 
Innovation Project (RBIP) of the People’s Bank / 
the GTZ as well as by the Hatton National Bank. 
In this approach the field officer establishes a 
closer relationship to the customer by linking the 
bank more closely to the client. Banks could 
implement more personalised relations to their 
SSE clients and improve their methods of 
checking customers. On the one hand, this would 
lower default costs because banks would in this 
case be in a better position to evaluate the finan-
cial capacity of their clients. However, on the 
other hand this would raise bank transaction costs. 
Fourth, banks could increase their interest rates 
for small loans in order to realise profits, as is 
illustrated by the example of moneyshops, an 
approach that has been successfully introduced in 
the Philippines. The current credit supply prac-
tices of moneylenders indicate that SSEs are able 
to pay very high interest rates for flexible and 
quick credits. 
The history of pawnbroking in Sri Lanka and 
moneyshops in the Philippines serve as examples 
to illustrate cases in which banks have success-
fully adopted lending techniques of informal 
credit suppliers. 
Policy-makers  could contribute to the process by 
establishing a legal framework to enable banks to 
implement the recommendations on downscaling. 
Development organisations  could support banks 
in developing microfinance programmes. One 
example is the RBIP project of the GTZ and the 
People’s Bank mentioned above. 
Upgrading informal financial sector actors means 
transformation of informal financial transactions 
in the direction of more formality and profession-
alism. Moneylenders have no incentives to 
formalise their business. Most moneylenders were 
reluctant to register their moneylending business, 
which would require them to pay taxes, because 
this would not be of any advantage to them. 
However, the negative aspects of informality 
suggest that even without full upgrading a modi-
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fied approach to upgrading moneylenders could 
contribute to a better credit supply. 
This approach could be used to formalise the 
moneylending business at least to some degree. 
The Mediation Board, which has a mandate to 
settle loan disputes between moneylenders and 
their borrowers in a semi-formal way, is one solu-
tion to this problem. This institution reduces 
moneylenders’ risks and provides more security to 
the borrower. In cases of informal loan disputes 
mediation is possible if both parties agree to 
mediation, or if there is a written contract. Since 
the Mediation Board is not very well known in Sri 
Lanka, information on this mediation service 
should be improved. Sri Lankan policy-makers 
could support an enlarged scope for the Mediation 
Board as an institution for the settlement of in-
formal loan disputes. 
ROSCAs  do not have much potential to upgrade 
their activities, either. The majority of ROSCA 
organisers reported that they would not be inter-
ested in a more professional approach to organis-
ing one or even several ROSCAs, because the risk 
and responsibility involved in the organisation of 
a ROSCA are large. Similarly, enlarging the size 
of the group was also not an attractive option for 
most ROSCA members. The particular social 
character of their ROSCAs would suffer if too 
many members were accepted. In addition, the 
larger the groups, the less foreseeable the risks, 
and the greater the likelihood of delay and default. 
The only promising approach to a modified 
upgrading of ROSCAs would be to adopt some 
legal measures aimed at minimis ing the risks of 
delay and default for members as well as for 
organisers. 
On the one hand, introduction of some formal 
documentation for transactions in ROSCAs would 
conflict with the informal nature of ROSCAs. On 
the other hand, introduction of contracts between 
members and the organiser would give a legal 
form to the rules of ROSCAs. Such contracts 
could be used in court in cases of default to 
recover at least a part of the money concerned. Sri 
Lankan policy-makers could promote better legal 
integration of ROSCAs. 
Measures to Adjust the Legal and Institutional 
Framework 
Additional measures could be used to support 
these approaches. For a lack of adequate colla t-
eral, SSEs are often unable to obtain large credits 
from banks. To improve this situation, it would be 
possible, to formalise assets of SSEs. In particular, 
SSEs are often unable to use land properties as 
collateral because there are no clear regulations on 
proving property rights, and land titles are as a 
rule not registered. Although solving this problem 
would be a time-consuming and costly process, 
policy-makers should promote the registration of 
land titles. 
Since SSEs are often highly indebted, the follow-
ing steps could help to avoid high indebtedness of 
SSEs or solve the problems of highly indebted 
SSEs. First, policy-makers could establish an 
advisory board for highly indebted SSEs. The 
board not only could provide advice in cases of 
heavy indebtedness, it should also help SSEs to 
assess more carefully their own financial capaci-
ties. Second, policy-makers could promote a fair 
and transparent insolvency process for SSEs by 
building a semi-formal institution to regulate 
insolvency procedures. SSEs which service out-
standing loans by taking out new loans need be 
able to break out of this circle; this would be their 
only chance to start again with a new business. 
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1 Introduction 
It wasn’t until the 1970s that international donors 
and policy-makers in developing countries recog-
nised the potential of the informal financial sector. 
Experience and research in recent decades have 
shown that the informal financial sector can make 
a viable contribution to development. Today, its 
important role in the financing of rural and urban 
small-scale enterprises (SSEs), as well as the role 
played by SSEs in poverty reduction and 
employment creation, have been widely recog-
nised. 1 One of the major constraints faced by 
SSEs’ is the lack of access to adequate credit in 
the formal as well as in the informal financial 
sector.2 On the one hand, for many SSEs’ access 
to formal credit is constrained because of banking 
laws regulating collateral requirements as well as 
other rules in the formal sector. On the other hand, 
the informal credit market is an important source 
of finance. However, the informal financial sector 
is unable to satisfy the financial needs of SSEs 
due to high interest rates, default risks and lack of 
enforceability. The main research question of this 
study is therefore: How can access to credit for 
SSEs be improved? 
1.1 Objective and Conduct of the Study 
The objective of the present study is to find solu-
tions which improve credit access for SSEs. With 
this in mind, we analysed the status quo and the 
problems of informal credit relations. Different 
approaches are currently under discussion by 
donors and experts in microfinance. The “finan-
cial systems approach” can be seen as the most 
holistic approach to the problem. It includes the 
micro-, meso- and macro-level. The main aim is 
to enable credit suppliers to operate profitably – 
instead of using subsidies or donor funds – and to 
                                                 
1 See, for example, ADB (1997), pp. 6-7; GEMINI (1995), 
p. 3; Karunanayake (2001), p. 12. 
2 See ADB (2001), p. 4; Fernando (2001), p. 28 and JICA 
(2000), p. 18; Lankathilake (2000), p. 9; Weerasekara 
(2001), p. 106. 
provide good financial services to their clients, 
SSEs. 
One part of this study examines the financial 
systems approach – financial institution building, 
which mainly comprises three (sub-)approaches. 
First, it would be possible to adapt the formal 
sector’s services to the specific needs of the poor 
(“downscaling”). Second, the informal sector 
could be improved, or “upgraded.” Third, the 
informal and the formal sector could be linked 
(“linkage approach”). None of these approaches 
excludes the others. They can complement each 
other and lead to an integration of a country’s 
financial system in the long run. 
As the formal financial sector in Sri Lanka and 
other countries has been studied extensively, we 
concentrate on the informal financial sector. The 
main suppliers of credit in the informal financial 
sector in Sri Lanka to be investigated in this paper 
are moneylenders (ML) and Rotating Savings and 
Credit Associations (ROSCAs). Despite the im-
portant role they play in financing SSEs, they 
have received very little attention by research in 
Sri Lanka until now. Moneylenders in particular 
have rarely been analysed systematically in Sri 
Lanka or other countries. 
1.2 Research Methodology 
Our questionnaires include qualitative and quan-
titative elements and are based on plausibility 
rather than statistical representativeness, since the 
sample of interviewees was too large. The data 
were analysed on the basis of an analysis and 
understanding of single cases. The arguments are 
supported by the literature as well as by some 
expert interviews. 
The data used stem from semi-structured inter-
views conducted with SSEs and informal credit 
suppliers. We chose the semi-structured form of 
interview because it is more flexible and open 
than the structured interview.3 The questionnaires 
                                                 
3 See Neubert (2001), p. 26. 
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were organised according to the objectives of our 
study: the first part aimed at a status quo analysis, 
the second part at a problem analysis and the third 
part at assessing approaches to improving the 
current situation. Interviewing both demanders 
and suppliers of credit, we cross-checked the 
information and validity of the data. 
The research was carried out in two different 
regions, the Negombo area on the west coast and 
the area around Nuwara Eliya in the central high-
land province. We chose these regions because 
one of them is and the other is likely to be a proj-
ect region of our counterparts, the People’s Bank 
and the GTZ Rural Banking Innovations Project 
(RBIP), which facilitated contacts to many of our 
interview partners. 
The sample  of interview partners consists of 31 
SSEs, 27 moneylenders, 19 ROSCAs and of 24 
experts. It was chosen according to the following 
criteria: we concentrated on SSEs with informal 
credit relations. Access to moneylenders and 
ROSCAs was mainly facilitated by our counter-
parts, and we sought to cross-check our informa-
tion e.g. by asking SSEs about their contacts with 
moneylenders, or vice-versa. However, the sample 
was also determined by practicality. 
1.3 Organisation of Chapters  
The report starts off with an analysis of the infor-
mal financial sector in Sri Lanka. The first section 
of the chapter outlines the significance of the 
informal sector. The three levels of a financial 
system – formal, semiformal and informal – are 
briefly sketched, focusing on the strengths and 
weaknesses of the informal financial sector and its 
potential to satisfy the credit needs of SSEs. The 
last section of Chapter 2 provides an overview of 
the approaches of development finance. Chapter 3 
examines the demand side, i.e. the significance 
and financial needs of SSEs. The focus is on the 
credit relations of SSEs. Chapter 4 concentrates 
on the main suppliers of informal credit in Sri 
Lanka: moneylenders and ROSCAs, analysing 
their strengths and weaknesses and their potential 
to provide credit to SSEs. Finally, conclusions and 
recommendations are presented and discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
2 Microfinance in Sri Lanka: The Role of 
Various Actors of the Financial Sector 
This chapter outlines the components of the 
Financial System in Sri Lanka which are the 
formal, the informal, and the semiformal financial 
sectors. It further presents some approaches to 
development finance (2.2). 
2.1 Components of the Financial System 
in Sri Lanka 
As Figure 1 illustrates, all three segments of the 
financial sector, the informal, the semiformal, and 
the formal, are elements of the economic system. 
However, only the semiformal and formal finan-
cial sectors are covered by the legal system. In 
contrast to the informal and semiformal financial 
sector, the formal financial sector is subject to 
banking legislation. The main distinction between 
the three sectors is the question of operation inside 
or outside a country’s legal system.  
The legal system comprises all laws and regula-
tions as well as all actors and activities involved 
in legal enforcement of the law.4 Legal infrastruc-
ture provides enforcement mechanisms related to 
the actual demand for claim settlement. In deve l-
oping countries, provision of legal infrastructure 
is often restricted to specific financial activities or 
agents, i.e. those within the formal financial 
sector.5  
Before we come to the analysis of the different 
sectors, Figure 2 presents an overview of the 
actors of the financial system. The bold lines 
represent the respective actors’ importance in this 
study, whereas the actors connected by thin lines 
are not considered: In this study, we concentrate 
                                                 
4 See Krahnen / Schmidt (1994), p. 33. 
5 See Krahnen / Schmidt (1994), p. 35. 
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on the demand side (SSEs) and the informal 
suppliers of credit. The credit suppliers of the Sri 
Lankan informal sector to be dealt with here are 
moneylenders and ROSCAs.  
2.1.1 The Formal Financial Sector in Sri 
Lanka 
2.1.1.1 Characteristics of the Formal 
Financial Sector in Sri Lanka 
The present study mainly focuses on banks 
because these are the main actors of the formal 
financial sector in the field of microfinance, in Sri 
Lanka as well. 6 In the formal financial sector, 
                                                 
6 See Conroy (2000), p. 283. 
lending activities are focused on large individual 
sums provided to private and government-owned 
enterprises in the modern industrial sector. High 
transaction costs reinforce this bias towards large 
loans. Fixed bureaucratic procedures dominate the 
process of lending.7 Therefore, SSEs are often 
excluded from these loan schemes. 
However, in Sri Lanka the formal financial sector 
has undertaken some efforts to become active in 
microfinance. Among the institutions regulated by 
the central bank, only banks play a relevant role in 
microfinance. There are two types of bank 
involved in the financing of SSEs in Sri Lanka: 
Regional Development Banks (RDBs) and 
 
                                                 
7 See Krahnen / Schmidt (1994), p. 32. 
Figure 1: The Formal, Semiformal and Informal Financial Sectors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Krahnen / Schmidt (1994), p. 34 
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commercial banks. One popular form of credit in 
Sri Lanka is pawnbroking. Most pawnbrokers are 
registered and even commercial banks offer 
pawnbroking services to their clients. 
2.1.1.2 Regional Development Banks 
Regional Development Banks (RDBs) in Sri 
Lanka focus their activities on rural areas. In 
recent year they have undergone a major trans-
formation process. They have succeeded the 
Regional Rural Development Banks (RRDB) 
which were set up in 1985 as government institu-
tions with the objective of improving financial 
services to the rural poor. In order to support 
political decentralisation and to reduce the influ-
ence of the central bank, the country’s 17 RRDBs 
were transformed into eight RDBs in 1998. The 
two primary tasks of the RDBs are to promote 
rural development and to develop the projects of 
Samurdhi8 beneficiaries. Due to the fact that the 
                                                 
8 Samurdhi is a government programme aimed at 
supporting the incomes of the poor. Gunatilaka / Salih 
RRDBs have been deeply engaged in government 
poverty-alleviation lending programmes, they 
have been subject to political interventions.9 In 
spite of this, they are currently running their busi-
ness in a sustainable manner and 80 % of their 
loan portfolio consists of microcredits, i.e. credits 
of less than LKR 100,000, which are considered 
microcredits10. By the end of the year 2000 the 
full amount of outstanding microcredits was LKR 
5,244 million. 11 
2.1.1.3 Commercial Banks 
Commercial banks have discovered the microf i-
nance sector as a new field of interest. In the past, 
strict regulations on financial markets such as 
interest rate ceilings, high reserve requirements, 
                                                                            
(1999) or Nayar / Gunatilaka (2000) provide a 
comprehensive overview of Samurdhi. 
9 See McGuire, et al. (1998), p. 3. 
10 100,000 Sri Lankan Rupees equal 1,141 Euro (March 
2002). 
11 See Charitonenko / de Silva (2001), pp. 28-29. 
Figure 2: Financial Sector Actors 
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and directed credit lines prevented commercial 
banks from entering this sector. However, now 
that financial markets have been liberalised, and 
competition among the institutions in the sector is 
increasing, commercial banks are looking for new 
markets. By serving SSEs, some banks also wish 
to improve their public image. In addition, success 
stories from some other Asian countries are 
attracting new players to this field. In spite of 
these encouraging developments, there still 
remain several obstacles to commercial bank 
lending to SSEs.12 
In general, there are three major reasons why 
involvement of banks in the financing of SSEs is 
limited. First, they are unable to assess a clients’ 
risk in an appropriate manner. The instruments 
commonly used by banks to evaluate risks are 
credit checks, project appraisal and availability of 
formal collateral. However, SSEs in most cases 
neither have sound book-keeping, a credit ranking 
nor any viable collateral.13 Second, the transaction 
costs involved in processing small and short-term 
loans are relatively high.14 Overhead costs become 
prohibitively expensive, because they cannot be 
covered by the spreads on these small sums.15 
Third, it is difficult for most banks to build up a 
sound relationship with their SSE clients for the 
following reasons. Commonly, the overall 
commitment to SSE lending in commercial banks 
is weak. In addition, lack of personal relationships 
and high administrative requirements often keep 
SSE clients from borrowing from banks.16 
However, compared to non-formal actors, banks 
also have some advantages in financing SSEs. 
Since they are subject to regulatory requirements, 
they have to meet the conditions of financial 
disclosure, ownership and capital adequacy. These 
conditions ensure careful management. Most 
banks have a vast network of branches, which 
                                                 
12 See Baydas / Graham / Valenzuela (1997), pp. 1-2. 
13 See Rhyne / Otero (1994), p. 13. 
14 See UNCTAD (no time), p. 8. 
15 See Jackelen (1989), p. 133. 
16 See Baydas / Graham / Valenzuela (1997), p. 3. 
enables them to serve a large number of clients. 
They also have the administrative and accounting 
systems as well as internal controls needed to 
cope with numerous transactions. In addition, 
commercial banks offer a wide range of financial 
products which can be of great value to SSEs.17 
In Sri Lanka, there are 26 commercial banks, two 
of which are run by the state, six privately 
organised and 18 owned by foreign institutions.18 
In the commercial banking sector, four institutions 
play a major role in SSE-financing: the two state-
owned banks (the People’s Bank and the Bank of 
Ceylon) and two private commercial banks 
(Hatton National Bank and Seylan Bank).19 
The two state-owned banks focus their activities 
on rural areas. However, the need to increase their 
competitiveness has induced them to reduce their 
business in the agricultural sector and to move 
away from small loans. They mainly have acted as 
financial intermediaries for government poverty 
alleviation programmes. Until now, they have 
hardly been able to reach the poor.20  
The People’s Bank started to provide microf i-
nance when it was founded in 1961. However, 
costing an annual interest rate of 10-14 % (the 
market interest rate is around 24-28 % per annum, 
depending on the product), these activities are 
highly subsidised. By June 2001, the bank had 
194,200 microcredits outstanding, with an average 
loan size of LKR 10,000. The figure has remained 
at about the same level for the past three years.21 
In 1973 the Bank of Ceylon started out with its 
microfinance activities, which were initiated by 
the government in order to serve the poor. By 
1999 the bank was serving about 330,000 clients. 
This figure declined to about 100,000 in 2001. 
During the same period, the volume of out-
                                                 
17 See Baydas / Graham / Valenzuela (1997), p. 3. 
18 See Conroy (2000), p. 2. 
19 See Levitsky (1990), p. 45. 
20 See McGuire, et al. (1998), p. 3. 
21 See Charitonenko / de Silva (2001), p. 18. 
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standing loans declined from 3,020 to 1,831 
million LKR. This shrinkage process clearly indi-
cates the bank’s shift away from the microfinance 
sector. The average recovery rate is 70 % for 
loans below LKR 50,000. By the end of 2001 the 
bank had to write off 27 % of its total microcredit 
portfolio. According to the bank’s own estima-
tions, it had lost LKR 43.7 million in its microfi-
nance business by August 2001. 22 
By 1997, the Seylan Bank had become interested 
in the microfinance sector. This commitment goes 
back to the chairman’s strong dedication to social 
questions. The bank runs a small number of 
projects in remote areas, primarily in the field of 
agriculture. Its credits range from LKR 10,000 to 
LKR 250,000, the average volume being LKR 
25,000. The bank is strongly involved in “credit 
plus” activities for farmers. These include the 
organisation of health services, business training 
and even checking soil conditions. A pioneer in 
Sri Lanka, Seylan Bank has also introduced a 
credit card system. By June 2001, the Seylan 
Bank was serving about 4,500 clients with an 
overall credit volume of LKR 99 million. When 
this programme was initiated, the intention was 
not to run it in a profitable way. However, the 
bank intends to reach the break-even point within 
the coming years. Repayment ratios are subject to 
sharp fluctuations, as they are dependent on 
harvest results.23 
Of all listed institutions, the Hatton National Bank 
is the only institution running a profitable micro-
finance business. The bank started its microf i-
nance programme (“Gami Pubudu”) in 1989 in 
view of emerging civil unrest due to high numbers 
of unemployed people, particularly in rural areas. 
At first, the government intended to co-operate 
with the bank, but then the Hatton National Bank 
decided to run its own programme. The bank 
wanted to reach three major objectives: social 
mobilisation, improvement of rural savings 
                                                 
22 See Charitonenko / de Silva (2001), pp. 17-18. 
23 See Charitonenko / de Silva (2001), pp. 27-28, Expert 
Interview with the Chief Manager of the Bank’s 
Development Banking Department. 
opportunities, particularly for women and 
children, and promotion of growing micro-enter-
prises to enable them to develop into small or 
even medium-sized enterprises. Like to the RBIP 
Project, the bank works with a field officer. 
Furthermore, collateral and application require-
ments have been adapted to the needs of clients.24 
Since its inception, the programme’s concept has 
remained constant. However, some adjustments 
have had to be made in the past three years in 
order to make the programme profitable: interest 
rates rose from 18 % to 22 % per annum, the 
average loan size increased from LKR 26,000 to 
LKR 75,000, and the numbers of clients per field 
officer have been reduced. By June 2001 the bank 
was serving 9,237 clients.25 
2.1.1.4 Pawnbroking in Sri Lanka 
Pawnbroking is considered the oldest form of 
lending, and it plays a very important role in Sri 
Lanka. Due to the popularity and efficiency of 
pawnbroking, many Sri Lankan commercial banks 
offer pawnbroking services. 
Pawnbrokers offer loans against collateral. This 
collateral can have various forms: household 
articles, machines or, a means very popular in Sri 
Lanka, gold. Registered pawnbrokers and banks 
usually accept only gold as pawned items. The 
size of the loans granted by licensed pawnbrokers 
varies between 50 % (banks) and 80 % of the 
value of the pawned article, depending on the 
customer and his records.26 Loan periods tend to 
be up to one year, but customers are allowed to 
repay earlier. In the latter case, they pay only the 
interest for the time the money was borrowed. The 
interest rate, 2-4 % at banks and 5 % at licensed 
pawnbrokers, is slightly higher than the commer-
cial rate but much lower than interest rates of 
informal moneylenders. The main advantage of 
                                                 
24 See Gallardo et al. (1997a) and (1997b), pp. 1-3. 
25 See Charitonenko / de Silva (2001), pp. 25-26. 
26 See Bouman / Bastiaanssen (1992), p. 187. 
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pawnbroking is the fact that it is extremely fast; 
the entire transaction takes about five minutes. 
There are two types of pawnbroker in Sri Lanka, 
private and public. The pawnbroking services 
offered by banks such as the People’s Bank are 
considered public. Private pawnbrokers can be 
subdivided into registered and non-registered 
pawnbrokers. Registered pawnbrokers have a 
license and are subject to the Pawnbrokers Ordi-
nance.27 They pay only 2 % business turnover tax, 
which is passed on to clients. The only condition 
required to borrow from a licensed pawnbroker or 
a bank, apart from owning, say, an item of gold to 
pawn, is an identification card. Non-registered 
pawnbrokers do not pay taxes, but they charge 
interest rates higher than the pawnbrokers act 
allows. Thus, they make customers pay for the 
extra risk involved in illegal pawnbroking.28 
According to the definition of the formal financial 
sector (Figure 1), pawnbroking services offered 
by banks are classified as formal, licensed pawn-
brokers as semiformal, and unlicensed pawnbro-
kers as informal. 
The People’s Bank was the first bank in Sri Lanka 
to offer pawning services to its clients, starting in 
1964. The aim was to compete with the informal 
sector. By 1970, 90 rural banks were part of the 
People’s Bank’s network, 13 years later already 
840 banks had joined the network. Pawnbroking 
in the People’s Bank was so successful that by 
1970 64 % of all loans provided by banks were 
based on pledged gold , and in 1983 pawn loans 
already made up 80 % of all loans disbursed by 
the People’s Bank.29 In 1998, an amendment was 
added to the banking law that allowed other banks 
to offer pawnbroking services. Since then, pawn-
broking has become even more popular.30 
                                                 
27 The Pawnbrokers’ Ordinance No. 30 of 1942. 
28 See Bouman / Bastiaanssen (1992), p. 187. 
29 See Bouman / Bastiaanssen (1992), p. 186. 
30 See Grashof (2002), p. 2. 
2.1.2 The Semiformal Financial Sector 
The term “semiformal” is commonly used as a 
label for the grey area between formality and 
informality. As illustrated in Figure 1, semiformal 
actors are financial institutions that are not subject 
to banking laws, though they do operate within a 
country’s legal system. 31 The most common semi-
formal financial actors are non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and credit co-operatives 
(CCs)32.33 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) play an 
outstanding role in the field of microfinance pro-
jects and programmes in most developing 
countries. They account for more than half of all 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) in Asia, Africa, 
and Latin America. They have a broad outreach 
and as a rule provide the largest share of small 
loans.34 NGOs are usually classified as semiformal 
MFIs, and operate between the formal level of 
banks and the often informal level of microcredit-
demanding micro-entrepreneurs or poor 
individuals. However, NGOs are sometimes 
referred to as informal credit suppliers, mainly 
when the term “NGO” is used to include local, 
more grassroots-oriented collective organisa-
tions.35 
Financial NGOs can fulfil different tasks in 
microfinance. Historically, many NGOs have 
engaged in distributing subsidised money as 
“loans.” This kind of microcredit programme has 
                                                 
31 See U Tun Wai (1992), p. 339; Krahnen / Schmidt 
(1994), p. 31; Ledgerwood (1999), p. 101. 
32 Credit Co-operatives are sometimes also known as 
Credit Unions, Savings and Loans Co-operatives, Thrift 
and Credit Co-operatives (TCCs) or Financial Co-
operatives. See Ledgerwood (1999), p. 101. 
33 Matin, et al. (1999), p. 10. 
34 See Lapenu / Zeller (2001), p. 23. The authors have 
compiled the experiences of 1,500 microfinance 
institutions in 85 developing countries. 
35 There exist a variety of names for non-profit-oriented 
local organisations. Some authors use terms such as 
Private Voluntary Organisations (PVOs), Community 
Based Organisations (CBOs) or People’s Organisation 
(P-Orgs), which here are all categorised as SHGs. 
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suffered from inefficiency and low repayment 
rates. Such programmes have been heavily criti-
cised for these weaknesses.36 Today, the common 
opinion on the role of financial NGOs emphasises 
is that they need to be financially sustainable and 
to operate on a profitable basis. 
In Sri Lanka, the most important financial NGO is 
the Sarvodaya Economic Enterprise Development 
Service (SEEDS). SEEDS is the economic devel-
opment arm of the large Sarvodaya movement, 
which mainly works in the field of participatory 
rural development. The members of SEEDS 
mainly participate in these financial programmes 
to gain access to savings rather than credit, so 
SEEDS is currently concentrating on the enlarge-
ment of a village banking network. Another major 
player is the quasi-NGO Samurdhi, with its 
Samurdhi Banking Societies. Although it is a 
governmental poverty-alleviation programme, it 
uses NGO methods in microfinance. Members are 
organised in basic self-help groups that collect 
savings and disburse group loans.37 
Credit co-operatives (CCs) also play a significant 
role in the provision of financial services to poor 
entrepreneurs or individuals. CCs are organised 
according to basic co-operative principles: every 
member owns an equal share of the co-operative. 
There are no external shareholders. All members 
have equal rights in terms of policy influence or 
voting rights. CCs are run by co-operative 
meetings representing the entire membership, 
which are usually called the general assembly. 
Commonly, CCs belong to a national league of 
affiliated CCs, which is the called the “apex 
body”. 
CCs almost exclusively provide financial services. 
The members of a CC provide capital to the CC, 
mainly equal shares. At the same time, the 
                                                 
36 See Dichter (1996); Schmidt / Zeitinger (1995); Abugre 
(1994); Rhyne / Otero (1994). 
37 See Conroy (2000), pp. 289-291. For a history of 
development of SEEDS, see SEEDS (1999) and (2000). 
Other NGOs are, for example, Agromart, Arthacharya 
Foundation, South Asian Partnership in Sri or Lanka. 
See Gant et al. (2002), pp. 125-127. 
members (and sometimes also non-members) can 
deposit savings. Parts of this accumulated, self-
generated capital can then be disbursed as loans to 
members. CCs generally request little or no 
collateral, but attach much significance to 
personal references. Members become lenders and 
borrowers at the same time. 
In Sri Lanka, two types of co-operatives play an 
outstanding role in microfinance, Co-operative 
Rural Banks (CRBs)38 and Thrift and Credit Co-
operatives (TCCs).39 Both are regulated by the 
Department of Co-operatives and not by the 
Central Bank. CRBs have been an important 
source of mobilising savings but have some 
difficulties in lending on money effectively. 
Today, a network of co-operative rural banking 
unions operates 1,418 CRBs in the country, 
handling 5.3 million savings accounts. The TCCs 
in Sri Lanka are organised in a national federa-
tion, which is known as the SANASA movement. 
It was founded in 1906 in order to increase 
financial services in rural areas. Today, SANASA 
provides a large range of products, e.g. microfi-
nance schemes, insurance, and training facilities 
and has been transformed into a social movement. 
More than 8,000 primary co-operative societies 
mobilise savings and offer microcredits for 
income-generating and consumption purposes to 
more than one million members.40 
2.1.3 The Informal Financial Sector 
The informal financial sector in developing 
countries is important for financing informal 
sector clients, i.e. SSEs. 30 to 70 % of total 
employment in developing countries is accounted 
                                                 
38 In 2000, RDB / RRDBs provided more than 50 % of all 
microcredits in Sri Lanka. Senanayake (2001), p. 4. 
39 Hulme / Montgomery (1994) provide an overview of 
TCCs in Sri Lanka. 
40 See Conroy (2000), pp. 286-289 and Sharif (2000), 
pp. 8-11. In 2000, TCCs and SANASA Development 
Bank provided 13 % of all microcredits in Sri Lanka. 
Senanayake (2001), p. 4. 
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for by the informal sector.41 This is also the case 
in Sri Lanka.  
Informal financial markets in Sri Lanka originated 
from the colonial banking system, which provided 
no services to the local population, either rural or 
urban.42 The informal suppliers of microcredits 
play the most important role in Sri Lanka.43 
According to Sanderatne and Senanayake, the 
informal financial sector accounts for an estimated 
30 % of all financial transactions in Sri Lanka.44 
In 1986/87 a central bank survey even stated that 
75 % of credit transactions in Sri Lanka originated 
from the informal financ ial sector.45 
In contrast to the formal financial sector, the 
informal sector acts outside the regulations 
imposed on the formal sector. Informal actors are 
not subject to supervision by the banking and 
monetary authorities; they often do not comply 
with book-keeping standards and are not reflected 
in official statistics. Furthermore, informal actors 
do not pay taxes and are not subject to statutes on 
usury.46 They are not allowed to take deposits. 
The main actors in the informal financial sector 
are moneylenders and self-help groups such as 
ROSCAs. 
The characteristics of informality include personal 
knowledge of the client and flexibility in respect 
of working hours, collateral and interest rates, to 
name only a few. Suppliers concentrate on small 
loans for SSEs. Loans are often disbursed without 
formal collateral, sometimes even without 
interest.47 Repayment rates are generally high, 
even though interest rates are above average. 
Familiarity with clients and social sanctions 
substitute for collateral and legal enforcement. 
                                                 
41 See ADB (1990), p. 187; Krahnen / Schmidt (1994), 
p. 31. 
42 See Sanderatne / Senanayake (1989), p. 127. 
43 See Conroy (2000), p. 283. 
44 See Sanderatne / Senanayake (1989), p. 133. 
45 See Conroy (2000), p. 283. 
46 See ADB (1990), p. 187. 
47 See U Tun Wai (1992), p. 341. 
However, lack of legal enforceability leads 
economic agents to develop tailor-made contract 
forms that diminish the risk involved in lending. 
Generally, the credit terms and procedures are 
adapted to the situation of the client, i.e. they are 
not bureaucratic.48 
Contrary to the general notion that informal finan-
cial markets are located in rural areas only, 
Sanderatne and Senanayake point out that infor-
mal lenders are responsible for many financial 
transactions in the urban sector in Sri Lanka. 
Thus, urban small enterprises are mostly financed 
through informal loans.49 However, according to 
the Foundation for Development Co-operation, 
informal credit suppliers are even more important 
in rural areas: 75 % of the financial needs of the 
rural poor in Sri Lanka are satisfied by the infor-
mal sector.50 
Informal finance can also harm the national 
economy, and it may involve a criminal back-
ground. Krahnen and Schmidt argue that assign-
ment of an activity to the informal sector may also 
be a matter of choice, for example in the case of 
illegal business transactions.51 Also, many urban 
actors invest in the urban informal market because 
of the high returns it offers.52 Even in the field of 
savings and credit, there is a genuine choice 
available between informal rotating clubs and 
semiformal credit co-operatives.53 
2.2 Financial Development Approaches 
In this section, financial development approaches 
are discussed with a view to improving the access 
of SSEs to credits. The term “development 
                                                 
48 See Germidis / Kessler / Meghir (1991), pp. 48-49. 
49 See Sanderatne / Senanayake (1989), p. 131. 
50 See Foundation for Development Co-operation (1993), 
p. 186. 
51 See Krahnen / Schmidt (1994), p. 36. 
52 See Sanderatne / Senanayake (1989), p. 131. 
53 See Krahnen / Schmidt (1994), p. 36. 
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finance” comprises the field of development co-
operation and thus refers to all aspects of the 
financial system of developing countries, 
including the national specif ications of a financial 
system, its influence on national economic devel-
opment and approaches used by development co-
operation to change the system.54 
Since the experiences made with financial 
institution building has differed in various devel-
oping countries, there is a lively discussion under 
way on the best ways to improve financial 
systems. Germidis, Kessler and Meghir 
summarise: ”While it is clear that there is a 
common goal - improve the functioning of finan-
cial systems in developing countries, reduce the 
need for external funds, ease the debt burden and 
provide financial services to as wide a population 
as possible so that people may gradually better 
their socio-economic condition - it is equally obvious 
that there are many different avenues to reach it.”55 
                                                 
54 See Schmidt (2000), p. 1. 
One major issue in the discussion is assessment of 
the informal financial sector. As discussed in 
Section 2.1, the existence of the informal financial 
sector is a fact in most developing countries. This 
is partly due to a dualistic economic structure, but 
also due to a number of advantages provided by 
informal financial actors (see Chapter 4). The 
relationship between the formal and the informal 
sector is characterised by three features: competi-
tion, complementarity, and co-operation. If regu-
lation of the formal sector causes financial trans-
actions to be shifted to the informal sector, com-
petition develops between the two sectors. Formal 
and informal suppliers of financial services can 
complement each other in their supply of 
customer-oriented services.56 Co-operation be-
tween the formal and the informal sector entails 
linking the two. 
Competition can best be illustrated by an 
example: In several countries, such as Bolivia, the  
 
                                                                            
55 Germidis / Kessler / Meghir (1991), p. 293. 
Box 1: A Brief History of Financial Development Co-operation 
A quick look at the history of development finance suggests that a couple of paradigm shifts have taken place. When it set 
out to influence financial systems in developing countries in the 1960s, lack of capital was identified as the most important 
constraint for financial development. The intention was to overcome this constraint by means of large capital transfers for 
industrialisation and infrastructure projects. However, soon development policy-makers had to recognise that large external 
capital transfers were not effective and failed to contribute to any broader access to capital for the majority of the 
population. On the contrary, it favoured the development of a dualistic structure (see Section 2.1). 
Consequently, the following phase of development finance concentrated on a broad outreach of credit programmes and 
fostered the target-group orientation approach. However, in the early 1980s the results of microcredit schemes were found 
to be disastrous in terms of effectiveness and sustainability. The credit programmes distributed money to poor people rather 
than lending it, thanks to highly subsidised capital and low or no interest rates, which resulted in low repayment rates. 
During the 1980s, lack of external capital was no longer seen as the major bottleneck of development finance. Two other 
policy fields formed the core of new approaches: liberalisation of financial markets and “financial institution building.” 
These two approaches are summed up under the term “financial system approaches.” The financial system approach takes 
into account the lessons learned from history, for example the fact that subsidised credits undermine financial development 
and that poor people are definitely able to pay market interest rates. Therefore, financial service providers in a financial 
system approach are expected to operate on a profitable basis (“financial sustainability”).a 
Today, development finance mainly concentrates on financial institution building. This means supporting financial actors 
and promoting sustainable and profitable financial institutions for all clients. 
Source: See Schmidt (2000), pp. 1-6. 
a See Ledgerwood (1999), pp. 1-3 for further details. 
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Philippines or Sri Lanka, informal finance grew 
when formal financial markets were 
underdeveloped.57 Thus, rigid regulation of the 
formal sector, such as repressive and interven-
tionist financial market policy, can enhance the 
growth prospects of the informal sector. 
A complementary relation between the two 
sectors is characterised by the very different 
services offered by formal and informal suppliers. 
Informal actors are regarded as logical suppliers 
of Fiebig points out, formal opportunities to save 
money can be the first contact of clients from the 
informal sector with formal finance, whereas 
microcredit remains in the realm of the informal 
sector.58 This example illustrates that the two 
sectors are not necessarily contradictory. 
Co-operation between the formal and informal 
financial sector can take on various forms. An 
example would be a moneylender who receives a 
formal loan and lends it on informally; or a ROSCA 
that saves money in the informal sector and deposits 
it in a commercial bank account. This already 
describes what is understood by linking the two 
financial sectors. 
However, most approaches to financial develop-
ment agree on the need to eliminate the broad 
outreach of informal activities and aim to reduce 
this financial dualism. 59 Krahnen and Schmidt go 
even further and state that a liberalised, formal 
financial market is a necessity to create a suffi-
cient supply of financial services for a broader 
mass of people.60 This strong orientation towards 
more formalised financial sectors is somewhat in 
contrast to some experiences made in South-East 
Asia. There, the “Banking with the Poor Project” 
has made positive experiences with approaches 
                                                                           
56 See Fiebig (1999), p. 34. 
57 See U Tun Wai (1992), p. 340. 
58 See Fiebig (1999), p. 36. 
59 See, for example, Schmidt (2000), p. 5; Germidis / 
Kessler / Meghir (1991), p. 207. 
60 See Krahnen / Schmidt (1994), p. 122. 
involving co-operation between the informal and 
the formal financial sector.61 
Three different approaches have been commonly 
addressed in the discussion over development 
finance and institution building:62 
— Downscaling the formal financial sector 
— Upgrading the informal financial sector 
— Linking the two financial sectors 
Downscaling refers to an approach that advocates 
strengthening the role of formal banks in the 
financial system. The approach consists of a 
number of measures that make banks “come 
down” to their clients, which means in effect 
becoming more accessible to the target group. 
This includes not only creation of more and 
smaller branches, but also supply of more 
adequate financial products to poorer clients and a 
stronger target-group orientation. One major tool 
of this approach is provision of training for 
commercial banks. Bank clerks are taught how to 
approach poorer clients and what microcredit 
products to supply. 63 
Upgrading the informal sector means a 
qualitative transformation towards formality and 
professionalism of informal financial activities. 
Upgrading can include measures aimed at further 
capacitating informal actors or improving their 
knowledge of financial business. The idea is to 
become more formal without losing the advan-
tages of operating informally, the insight being 
that “the informal financial sector can become a 
more efficient structure for collecting savings and 
distributing loans, particularly in rural areas, 
than it is at the present time.”64 
                                                 
61 See Foundation for Development Co-operation (1993), 
pp. 20-21. 
62 These three approaches are defined as “three-strategies 
view” by Krahnen / Schmidt (1994), p. 82. It can also be 
found in Germidis / Kesser / Meghir (1991), pp. 214-
139, although these authors add, as another approach a 
reform of macroeconomic policies. 
63 See Krahnen / Schmidt (1994), p. 83. 
64 Germidis / Kessler / Meghir (1991), p .232. 
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Linking the formal and informal financial sectors 
is an approach favoured by those who do not trust 
the two other approaches, i.e. who doubt that a 
bank will have enough social commitment to 
downgrade, and who believe that informal finan-
cial actors lose too many of their advantages in 
becoming more formal. The idea of linkage is to 
preserve the strengths of the existing informal 
financial actors, their appropriate organisational 
principles and their flexibility, while enhancing 
their financial impact through formal sector 
assistance. In this way each actor can make use of 
his comparative advantages in financial service 
provision. A common approach is to link commu-
nity-based self-help groups with banks via finan-
cial NGOs with a view to supplying more finan-
cial services to communities65. The linkage 
approach allows a broader outreach, which also 
allows banks to pass on their increasing transac-
tion costs to the informal actor or the financial 
intermediary. 
All approaches to improving the financial system 
either deal with institution building or the 
relations among financial sector actors. There is a 
lively discussion under way on the appropriate-
ness and effectiveness of the different approaches. 
The categorisation of three approaches, although 
widely used in development finance, is criticised 
as unnecessarily simplifying and reducing the set 
of opportunities available in the field of financial 
institution building. In particular, Krahnen and 
Schmidt complain about the inconsistency and 
incompleteness of this “three-strategies view.” 
They argue that the three categories are artificial, 
because a successful linkage approach necessarily 
has to include elements of downscaling of the 
formal financial actors involved as well as of 
upgrading informal financial actors. They addi-
tionally emphasise that concentrating on these 
three approaches would leave out the possibility 
                                                 
65 This type of linkage approach was pursued by the 
„Banking with the Poor Project.“ See Foundation for 
Development Co-operation (1993). 
of creating new financial institutions, which can 
be an appropriate solution as well.66 
Schmidt goes even further by stating that only 
creation of a new type of financial institution, in 
the form of a private corporation, would be 
suitable as an approach that is efficient and target-
group-oriented at the same time. His strong 
orientation to bank-like formal institutions and 
individual clients excludes all forms of linking up 
with traditional informal group lending, and he 
thus rejects the appropriateness of upgrading as 
well as of linkage approaches.67 However, his 
strong criticism of upgrading and linkage 
approaches mainly results from his experiences in 
Latin America, where he found the results of the 
two approaches to be disappointing.68 By contrast, 
experiences made with the Banking with the Poor 
Project in South-East Asia are different and much 
more positive. 
Germidis, Kessler and Meghir propose a strategy 
which is a mix between linking the two sectors 
and at the same time improving each of the actors 
involved. This combination is supposed to lead to 
an integration of the two financial sectors in the 
long-term. The authors give a range of recom-
mendations on how to reduce the gap between the 
formal and informal financial sectors in order to 
improve a financial system.69 They are less rigid 
in their policy recommendations and emphasise 
the need for integrated and complementary strate-
gies. The three approaches all contain important 
elements of an improvement of the financial 
sector and should go hand in hand to “softly 
integrate” the informal financial sector into the 
formal sector. While strongly favouring the for-
mality of financial institutions, Germidis, Kessler 
and Meghir point out the important linkage 
potential of informal institutions in developing 
                                                 
66 See Krahnen / Schmidt (1994), pp. 81-89, for the overall 
discussion and a critique of these three approaches. 
67 See Schmidt (2000), p. 8. 
68 See Schmidt / Zeitinger (1995) for an evaluation of 
credit-granting NGOs in Latin America. 
69 Germidis / Kessler / Meghir (1991), pp. 214-138. 
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countries, namely ROSCAs, Credit Co-operatives, 
and moneylenders.70 
Thus, the three different approaches do not auto-
matically exclude each other. In the long-term, the 
three approaches together can lead to what 
Germidis, Kessler and Meghir call integration of 
the financial system. 
Having had a look at some of the diverse argu-
ments on how to improve financial systems in 
developing countries, and which approach might 
best be pursued, it is necessary to focus on par-
ticular approaches and in particular on actors at 
the same time, as in our case study in Sri Lanka. 
3 Demand: The Unfulfilled Credit Needs 
of Small-Scale Enterprises (SSEs) 
Before looking into the supply side (Chapter 4), it 
is necessary to study the demand side, i.e. to 
examine the credit needs of SSEs in Sri Lanka. 
The present chapter will start out by analysing the 
significance of SSEs for poverty reduction and 
employment in Sri Lanka (3.1), before examining 
the characteristics of SSEs (3.2) and the financial 
obstacles they face (3.3), and then going on to 
discuss the existing status of the credit relations of 
SSEs (3.4). The choices between different 
suppliers for various purposes are presented in 
3.5.1, and the next section (3.5.2) looks into the 
unsatisfied credit needs of SSEs. 
3.1 The Significance of SSEs for Poverty 
Reduction and Employment in Sri 
Lanka 
The role of SSEs as a source for employment is 
highly significant. Since SSEs operate on a 
labour-intensive basis, they are able to create 
employment. Due to low entry barrie rs in most 
sectors in which SSEs operate, start-ups absorb 
                                                 
70 See Germidis / Kessler / Meghir (1991), pp. 234-236. 
large shares of the workforce. Furthermore, SSEs 
offer job opportunities for low-skill and unskilled 
workers. Estimates indicate that microenterprises 
provide work for 20-40 % of Sri Lanka’s total 
labour force.71 If we include small enterprises, this 
share is assumed to be slightly higher. 
Many people working in the SSE sector are poor. 
Accordingly, promotion of SSEs is considered to 
be an adequate tool of poverty alleviation. 
However, it is essentia l to note that the SSE sector 
is not homogeneous but an extremely 
heterogeneous assemblage of enterprises. SSE 
owners are generally not as poor as their 
employees. Empirical results from other studies 
conducted in Sri Lanka suggest that about 30 % of 
SSEs owners are considered poor.72 This number 
slightly exceeds the national level of 25-30 %. In 
addition to this, the poverty profile of the SSE 
sector varies from region to region. In Sri Lanka, 
coastal areas are much more highly developed 
than the highlands. On average, employees of 
SSEs are poorer and have less formal education 
than those working in larger enterprises.73 
3.2 Characteristics of SSEs in Sri Lanka 
One criterion commonly used to identify SSEs in 
Sri Lanka is the number of employees.74 Other 
criteria such as capital or turnover are less appro-
priate for SSEs. Since there is often no book-
keeping, it is difficult to use these criteria. 
According to this definition, SSEs comprise all 
businesses with a maximum of 25 employees. 
They can be classified in two categories: small 
enterprises and microenterprises (MEs). While 
small enterprises employ 6-25 workers (according 
to the Department of Census and Statistics in Sri 
                                                 
71 See Charitonenko / de Silva (2001), p. 15. 
72 See Weeratunge (2002), p. 39. For the purpose of the 
study, we refer only to consumption poverty; according 
to the department for census and statistics, the upper 
poverty line per person and month is US$ 10. 
73 See Gulli (1998), pp. 7-9. 
74 See Fernando (2001), p. 7. 
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Lanka)75, microenterprises provide work for five 
or less people.76 SSEs can be categorised in many 
different ways. Corresponding to categorisations 
found in Sri Lanka, SSEs are classified in four 
sectors: services, trade, manufacturing and 
agriculture.77 
Although a common characteristic of SSEs in 
other countries is their informality, which implies 
that they are not registered and therefore pay no 
taxes, these results do not correspond with our 
findings from Sri Lanka. A recent survey from 
Central Province found that about 95 % of all 
enterprises are registered with the local authority. 
As microenterprises make up 70 % of all these 
enterprises, we conclude that the majority of SSEs 
operate in the formal sector.78 Fernando arrived at 
similar results, stating that “almost all entrepre-
neurs in all categories have realised the value of 
the legal status of their business”.79 
                                                 
75 See Premaratne (2000), p. 10. Sometimes empirical data 
about SSEs were unavailable, since the common 
classification of enterprises in Sri Lanka appears to 
break down into microenterprises on the hand and small 
and medium enterprises on the other. Therefore, we 
sometimes used data of microenterprises as a proxy for 
the whole SSE sector. This approach can be justified in 
two ways: first, Sri Lankan and international evidence 
suggests that small enterprises hold a very small share 
within the SSE group. Second, within our sample we 
only dealt with five of 31 enterprises which are small 
size businesses. 
76 See Teszler (1993), pp. 21-22. Using the criterion of 
employment size to separate economic activity involves 
some inadequacy. It does not take into account whether 
the labour force is underemployed or whether it is in 
disguised employment. Similarly, marginal productivity 
is not considered. Nevertheless, due to the deficiencies 
of alternative criteria, the employment criterion can 
serve as a second best solution. See Ngwira (1995), pp. 
50-52. In addition, our methodology did not enable us to 
take other criteria (like turnover or fixed assets) into 
consideration. Approaching our interview partners from 
the street, number of employees was the only suitable 
selection criterion. 
77 See Weerasekara (2001), p. 87. 
78 See Weerasekara (2001), pp. 97-98. 
79 See Fernando (2001), p. 6. 
It is difficult to distinguish formal from informal 
activities on the basis of their legal status. In most 
developing countries there are different 
institutions with which firms are required to 
register, and this may entail different legal 
consequences. For example, registration with one 
authority is adequate to qualify for a bank loan, 
but does not imply that the respective person has 
to pay taxes. It is therefore not possible to draw a 
clear-cut dividing line between formal and 
informal. It is rather a continuum. This fact makes 
international comparison rather difficult. How-
ever, due to a lack of adequate alternatives, we 
will stick with this approach for our purpose. 
Empirical studies suggest that most SSEs are run 
by men, but women make up the majority of 
employees in the SSE sector. This patriarchal 
structure is consistent with other results from 
South Asia.80 In contrast, SSEs headed by women 
are more likely to work from the household.81 
According to a survey in the Mahaweli district 
(Sri Lanka), 75 % of employees in MEs are 
women. Various programmes promoting SSEs 
suggest that most people working in SSEs are 
women.82 
It is difficult to evaluate the growth of SSEs 
because data on SSEs in Sri Lanka are rarely 
available. GEMINI reports that most microenter-
prises in Sri Lanka do not grow; they concentrate 
on surviving rather than growing. This holds true 
in particular for those microenterprises in Sri 
Lanka which employ family members.83 Data on 
Small-Scale Industries (SSIs) show that their 
growth rates amount to 3 % per annum.84 
                                                 
80 See Batten / Hettihewa (1999), p. 208. 
81 See USAID (1995), p. 1. Due to this fact we faced some 
difficulties in interviewing women as heads of SSEs. 
Within our sample women represent only 10 % of all our 
interview partners. 
82 See Charitonenko / de Silva (2001), p. 15. 
83 See GEMINI (1995), p. 2. 
84 See Lankathilake (2000), p. 12. Corresponding to our 
definition, SSIs are only SSEs in the manufacturing 
sector. No data were available on SSEs. 
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Usually, the quality of SSEs’ products are hardly 
in a position to compete with the trade-marked 
output of larger enterprises. However, their low 
prices make these goods available for a wide 
range of poor people. However, the market in Sri 
Lanka for these cheap products is growing 
narrower, with even poor people demanding 
higher-quality products. As in other developing 
countries85, SSEs in Sri Lanka make use of 
existing artisan traditions and knowledge for their 
production processes. SSEs usually use local raw 
materials. However, supplies of local raw 
materials have become increasingly difficult to 
obtain over the last years. Many SSEs owners see 
their growth chances restricted by scarcity of 
materials like wood, clay, rushes and reeds.86 
The management structure of most SSEs is weak 
and working conditions are poor. There is hardly 
any precise division of labour in Sri Lankan SSEs. 
Most SSEs do not keep books. They thus have no 
internal controlling mechanisms to indicate 
deficits. This lack of book-keeping makes it 
difficult for SSEs to gain access to formal sources 
of credit. Furthermore, wages are very low and 
fringe benefits are inferior to those of larger 
enterprises.87 
3.3 Financial Obstacles Facing SSEs 
The development and activities of SSEs are 
constrained by various obstacles, which include 
lack of access to markets, insufficient availability 
of inputs, limited saving possibilities, lack of 
access to credits, etc. While Weerasekara points 
out that access to sources of finance is just one of 
same constraints, Fernando states that in Sri 
Lanka most entrepreneurs consider access to 
financial resources as their major problem. 88 
                                                 
85 See Schneider-Barthold (1998), p. 2. 
86 See Karunanayake (2001), p. 14. 
87 See Halvorson-Quevedo (1991), p. 8. 
88 See Weerasekara (2001), p. 106; Fernando (2001), p. 28. 
In Sri Lanka, as in most developing countries, 
SSEs have no access or only restricted access to 
the formal banking sector. From the banks’ 
perspective, SSEs are for the most part considered 
unbankable. The major reasons are their high 
fixed transaction costs as well as their inability to 
conduct thorough risk assessment (many SSEs 
have no sound book-keeping). In the literature, 
findings on Sri Lanka are mixed. A USAID report 
reveals that “[l]ess than 3 per cent of entrepre-
neurs in microenterprises have received bank 
loans. The formal financial systems are underde-
veloped and unable to extend credit to significant 
numbers of these entrepreneurs.”89 However, 
Fernando identified banks (as opposed to informal 
sources) as the most important source of finance 
for SSEs in Central Province.90 Our findings 
indicate that only very poor SSEs do not have 
access to formal sources of financing. However, 
for those which do have access, the credit 
conditions are mostly inadequate. Many SSEs 
therefore enter the informal financial sector to 
obtain credits. 
However, the shortcomings of the informal 
financial sector constrain the development 
opportunities of SSEs in Sri Lanka. Often, entre-
preneurs borrow the capital they need from their 
family, friends or local moneylenders. In many 
cases the products or the terms of loans do not fit 
the requirements of SSEs. In addition, interest 
rates of moneylenders are often very high. Due to 
the shortcomings mentioned, the financial needs 
of SSEs cannot be met adequately by informal 
sector actors. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
89 See GEMINI (1995), p. vi. 
90 See Fernando (2001), p. 9. 
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3.4 Empirical Results: The Financial 
Relations of SSEs in Sri Lanka 
Before presenting the study’s detailed results, 
three general findings will be cited to introduce 
the empirical analysis of the credit relations of 
SSEs. First, the SSEs interviewed turned out to 
have very diverse financial relations in the formal 
and informal sectors. Some of our interview 
partners had only one source of credit, but the 
majority reported having relations to three or four 
different sources of credit. Second, many SSEs 
had relations to formal and informal financial 
sources at the same time. Third, some SSEs had 
no financial relations at all. 
As Table 1 illustrates, of the 31 SSEs we inter-
viewed, four had never taken out a loan. They 
lived on their savings and earnings or received 
transfers of money from their families. Among 
those who had credit relations, 21 had approached 
one or more moneylenders, 17 had taken out one 
or more bank loans, 16 were participating in a 
ROSCA and 19 pawned items regularly. Family 
and friends played an important role (named 15 
times respectively). Two persons had approached 
a leasing company. The following sections aim to 
analyse the role which each source of credit plays 
for small-scale entrepreneurs. 
Table 1: Credit Sources of SSEs in the Sample 
Sources of Credit: 
Number of SSEs 
Approaching this 
Source of Credit 
Number of Loans 
Obtained from this 
Source 
Moneylender 21 31 
Bank 17 27 
ROSCA 16 22 
Pawnbroker 19 27 
In-kind Credits 16 16 
Family & Friends 15 18 
Leasing 2 2 
Total 106 143 
Source: Authors’ survey 
Box 2: The Impact of Microcredit on the Enterprises and Poverty 
In general, an additional supply of credit increases the output of enterprises. However, these increases are distributed 
unevenly. As the results of several impact studiesa show, the overall effects are positive, though the picture is 
heterogeneous. Especially as far as women are concerned, the sales of enterprises have increased and products and services 
have been diversified. However, not all output has increased. Some sales figures have  stagnated or even decreased. As one 
study notes, the effect largely depends on market conditions. In addition, it was found that the impact on manufacturing 
enterprises was less pronounced than on the other sectors. 
The impacts on the income of SSEs were generally positive. On average, incomes have risen by 25-40 % due to the 
availability of additional financial resources. Regular borrowers in particular have raised their incomes. However, for some 
SSEs income has stagnated or even decreased. This shows that credit on its own is not enough. 
The outcomes on employment are mixed, though some features can be identified. In most cases, impacts on wages and 
labour are positive but limited. This increase has been concentrated among a small share of enterprises. As some studies 
show, men seem to benefit more from new opportunities than women. Most SSEs have only increased the number of 
family workers. This can be regarded as positive if it leads to higher productivity. It would be negative if the opportunity 
costs for the additional workload were not compensated for. In general, microcredits appear to have more of an impact on 
job stability than on job creation. 
Information on the impact of credits on productivity is limited. Results from Ecuador show that women tended to reduce 
their working hours because they earned more per hour, suggesting an increase in productivity. A study from Bangladesh 
found that income effects are lower than asset effects. This indicates that there are no significant effects on productivity.  
Source: See Sebstad / Chen (1996), pp. 8-19. 
a Sebstad / Chen (1996) give an overview, which contains the findings of 32 research reports that investigated the 
impact of microcredits. The outline covers case studies of 42 programmes in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. 
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3.4.1 The Role of Informal Credit 
Suppliers  
The Role of Moneylender Loans  
Moneylenders were the largest source group of 
loans taken out in our sample; on the whole, 21 
SSEs had financial relations with one or more 
moneylenders, and this does not include in-kind 
relations or credits granted by friends and 
relatives. The average conditions are compiled in 
Table 2. 
One important finding of the interviews is that 
monthly interest rates varied from region to region 
between about 4 and 11 %. About one half of 
loans were based on trust, and involved no 
physical collateral. Thus, trust is the outstanding 
basis of many moneylender loans. This underlines 
the fact that not taking formal collateral is an 
important strength of moneylenders. However, 
some SSEs reported that they had to hand in post-
dated cheques to their moneylenders. Some 
entrepreneurs told us that they were required to 
sign “blank sheets.” In the event of default, the 
moneylender then can insert his name, the volume 
of the loan and whatever else he might see fit to 
include as collateral or loan conditions. Although 
these “blank sheets” are not legally enforceable, 
the clients of these moneylenders believed that it 
is the moneylender’s right to demand them. 
Moneylenders appeared to use these “blank 
sheets” to threaten their clients. However, some 
SSEs stated that they had handed in “formal” 
collateral such as a deed to a house or vehicle 
papers. 
The most frequently named purposes of money-
lender loans were business purposes. Among all 
purposes, “debt repayment” was named nine 
times, followed by working capital (8) and 
investment purposes (5). Among debt repayment, 
the most important purpose of primary loans was 
working capital, mainly the purchase of inputs. 
Other primary loans were taken out to start up a 
business. In three cases a primary loan was taken 
out to repay debts to another moneylender, to a 
ROSCA, and to a pawnbroker. Thus, the money-
lender loan was the last (thus far) in a chain of 
loans taken out to service previous debts. The 
private purposes named were mainly house 
construction or weddings, while education and 
emergencies played a minor role. 
The perceptions of our interview partners as 
regards the strengths of moneylenders are quite 
diverse. Quick accessibility to moneylenders is 
definitely seen as an advantage, as is prompt loan 
disbursement. In summary, emphasis was placed 
on the low transaction costs involved in 
moneylender loans. It was additionally seen as an 
advantage that some moneylenders do not require 
collateral, that they are flexible in their loan 
conditions and that most moneylenders do not ask 
about the purpose of loans. However, these 
positive aspects were mainly mentioned by SSEs 
who take out regular loans with a known money-
lender. Persons who do not have a stable financial 
or social relation to a moneylender may see this 
differently. Most moneylenders tend to check a 
potential borrower very carefully before lending. 
Sometimes they even deny loans to persons 
unknown to them. Some of our entrepreneurs had 
approached a moneylender as the “lender of last 
Table 2: Characteristics of Moneylender Loans 
Loan Conditions: Average Median Maximum Minimum 
Loan Amount  62,183 LKR 25,000 LKR 350,000 LKR 1,000 LKR 
Interest Rate 7.8 % p.m. 6 % p.m. 20 % p.m. 0 % p.m. 
Repayment Period 13 months 4.5 months 72 months 1 month 
Collateral  Mainly based on trust / / / 
Source: Authors’ survey 
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resort,” without having any alternative. They 
complained about dependencies and usurious 
interest rates. Some interview partners even feared 
their moneylenders. 
Looking into weaknesses, the high interest rates 
taken by most moneylenders are perceived as the 
principle weakness. However, interviewees also 
complained about repayment modalities. Money-
lenders usually collect a monthly interest rate, but 
want to have the principal back at once. This 
causes problems for clients, as many entrepre-
neurs would prefer to pay mixed instalments. 
However, there were also SSEs that named no 
disadvantages and seemed to be quite content with 
their financial relations to their moneylender. In 
sum, the function of moneylenders for SSEs is to 
provide quick, short-term loans. 
The Role of In-kind Credit Relations  
In-kind credit relations played a role for half of 
the entrepreneurs interviewed. These in-kind 
relations mainly are bound up with purchases of 
inputs on commission. This also includes to the 
very commonly mentioned need for loans for 
“working capital,” which means in the majority of 
cases purchases of inputs. 
There are different reasons for purchase of inputs 
on commission. The practice indicates a tight 
relation between input supplier and entrepreneur. 
However, in the majority of cases reported to us 
entrepreneurs had no money at hand to pay their 
input dealer when they approached him and 
therefore had to buy the goods on commission. 
The repayment period was usually not longer than 
one month. It was difficult to determine whether 
interest is paid in in-kind relationships. This is due 
to the fact that most interview partners did not 
know whether or not they pay interest in the event 
that they pay their debt a month later. Sometimes 
1 % of the purchase price is charged as a 
commission. 
One common way to secure in-kind credits is to 
hand over a post-dated cheque, which serves as 
collateral for the input supplier. This cheque can 
be cashed about one month later, when the 
entrepreneur has sold some items and gained more 
liquidity. We consider most cases of in-kind 
credits as normal and durable business relations, 
particularly important in the trading sector. 
Many entrepreneurs reported that in-kind credit on 
purchases is very convenient for them. The 
transaction costs involved in searching for and 
purchasing goods are reduced in this way and this 
may also entail the establishment of stable 
supplier-seller relations. Thus, one strength of in-
kind relations is the ease and reliability of the 
transaction. The input supplier does not demand 
money immediately, a fact which can be seen as a 
service to his client. However, this involves a 
danger that some SSEs will have no choice on 
where to purchase their inputs. Some may not be 
well informed about the market and always 
approach always the same input supplier, even 
though the latter sells his products at exploitative 
prices. 
The Role of Friends and Family Members  
Looking at all informal loans, friends and family 
members played a significant role for our 
interview partners (18 loans). The conditions  for 
loans granted by friends or family members were 
quite similar. Friends and family members do not 
ask for interest or collateral. They usually do not 
fix the repayment period (apart from one case 
where the repayment for a LKR 50,000 loan was 
fixed at two years), whereas financial relations to 
friends appear to be of shorter duration. 
There are two frequent purposes of such loans: 
working capital and business start-ups, and this 
makes this source the most important one for 
business newcomers. Reasons stated for loans 
were mainly business purposes, not private ones. 
There are two explanations for this phenomenon: 
first, if there is money in the family to borrow, it 
is cheaper and easier to obtain it from family 
members than elsewhere; second, it may be that 
only friends and family are willing and able to 
provide high-risk credits. There were no 
weaknesses mentioned. Consequently, friends and 
family are the cheapest and most convenient 
source of credit for SSEs. 
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The Role of ROSCAs 
More than half of our SSE interview partners 
participated in one or more ROSCAs. Overall, 
they explained to us the characteristics of 22 
ROSCAs. The basic data are described in Table  3. 
The funds were used for business and private 
purposes. House construction played the major 
role within private consumption. Some ROSCA 
funds were also used for working capital and debt 
repayment, which included all sorts of primary 
loans obtained from moneylenders, pawnbrokers 
and family members. 
To sum up the reported strengths of ROSCA mem-
bership, for most of the SSEs interviewed the need 
to save was the most important incentive to 
partic ipate in a ROSCA. In addition, easy access to a 
large volume of money and flexibility on payment 
modalities were mentioned. There were only a few 
weaknesses associated with ROSCA membership: 
lack of legal enforceability and the fact that 
quick disbursement is not always guaranteed. 
Summing up the purposes for which the funds 
were used as well as the strengths and weaknesses 
of ROSCAs, it becomes obvious that the role of 
ROSCAs for the SSEs interviewed was to provide 
flexible savings services and credits in various 
amounts on a trust basis and without any collateral 
requirement. 
3.4.2 The Role of Formal Credit 
Suppliers  
The Role of Banks 
Half of the SSEs interviewed had taken out one or 
more bank loans. Table 4 compiles the basic data 
on these bank loans and their conditions. 
The usual collateral provided for a bank loan was 
a mortgage on a house, on land or on both. To 
secure bank loans with two or three guarantors 
was the other large group of collateral. Interest-
ingly, guarantors were required exclusively in the 
Hill Country (Nuwara Eliya and Maskeliya), but 
not in Negombo. Some SSEs stated that it was 
their personal relation to a bank staff or manager 
Table 3: Characteristics of ROSCAs (SSE members) 
Characteristi cs Average Median Maximum Minimum 
Fund 118,000 LKR 72,000 LKR 480,000 LKR 4,500 LKR 
Contribution (p.m.) 8,250 LKR 6,000 LKR 30,000 LKR 1,000 LKR 
Members 15 15 26 9 
Duration 14 months 15 months 26 months 4 months 
Source: Authors’ survey 
Table 4: Characteristics of Bank Loans 
Loan Conditions: Average Median Maximum Minimum 
Loan Amount  135,385 LKR 205,000 LKR 1,000,000 LKR 10,000 LKR 
Interest Rate p.a. 19.1 % 23.5 % 30 % 3.5 % 
Repayment Period 3 years 4 years 10 years 1 month 
Collateral  
Mortgage on houses / land (14) 
Guarantors (7) 
/ / / 
Source: Authors’ survey  
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that secured their bank loans. However, only some 
interview partners mentioned that their own 
savings at the bank may have served as colla teral. 
As regards the purpose of bank loans, SSEs 
mainly asked banks for loans for working capital 
for their business. They used their access to bank 
loans as a source of liquidity, often for the 
purchase of inputs. The second most important 
reasons indicated for bank loans were to invest 
and to repay debts. It is easy to explain why bank 
loans serve for investment purposes. Bank loans 
are on average larger and the repayment period is 
longer than with all other sources of credit, but 
banks takes longer to disburse the money. Since 
larger business investments are usually not ad hoc, 
the long procedures at banks can be taken into 
account in planning an investment. 
Repayment of debts to moneylenders, pawnbro-
kers and ROSCAs was another main purpose of 
bank loans. Obviously, bank loans may play a role 
in informal debt repayment. This is surprising 
because people usually do not formulate a loan 
proposal to a bank specifying debt repayment as 
the purpose of the loan – to say nothing of the 
likelihood of obtaining a bank loan for that 
purpose. The original objective of most interview 
partners in applying for a bank loan was related to 
business (either working capital or investment 
needs), but once the loan was obtained, it was 
sometimes used for different purposes, such as 
repayment of other debts. Looking at the efforts of 
some credit schemes to promote self-employment, 
we found some entrepreneurs who used a bank 
loan to start-up a business. 
The outstanding strength of banks as credit 
suppliers is seen in their low interest rates. 
Another important advantage of bank loans is that 
those who know how the bank system works 
found the procedures transparent and the require-
ments reliable – the keyword mentioned in the 
interviews was “secure loan conditions.” Some 
interview partners mentioned that they very much 
appreciate the fact that the repayment instalments 
already contain part of capital recovery. This is 
not the case for most loans taken from money-
lenders and pawnbrokers, where usually only the 
monthly interest is paid, while the full principle 
amount remains to be recovered at once. In 
addition, some SSEs favour banks for providing 
them with larger volumes of money. Other inter-
viewees commented e.g. that a bank is easily 
accessible and that banks are reliable partners in 
planning the future of a business. 
The most important weakness is the fact that 
banks are known for the long procedures they 
need from the appraisal to the disbursement of a 
loan. A disadvantage was seen in the fact that a 
borrower is required pay back a current bank loan 
before obtaining a new one. This is an indication 
of the credit-seeking mentality of some SSEs, 
which are so in need of money that they tend to 
take more and more credit without being able to 
service their debts. Other disadvantages were 
onerous documentation requirements, complicated 
paperwork and the need to put up formal colla t-
eral. 
The role of banks as credit suppliers can be 
summarised as follows: banks provide cheap 
money with secure conditions and convenient 
repayment modalities. They make large amounts 
of money available, but they take their time in 
processing a loan and they provide no short-term 
loans. Bank loans serve to satisfy needs for large 
sums for use as predictable working capital and 
long-term investments. 
The Role of Pawnbrokers  
Pawnbrokers were often approached by SSEs, and 
sometimes these SSEs had received more than one 
loan from a pawnbroker. Our interview partners 
approached both licensed pawnbrokers and 
pawning centres of banks. Table 5 provides more 
details on the loan conditions of pawnbrokers. 
Several interview partners mentioned that bank 
pawning centres have lower interest rates (2-4 % 
per month), but do not give more than 50 % of the 
value of the pawned item as a loan. In contrast, 
licensed pawnbrokers tend to take higher interest 
rates (4-5 % per month), but give up to 90 % of 
the value of the pawned item as a loan. Licensed 
pawnbrokers are therefore a credit source of last 
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resort. This is illustrated by the high number of 
emergency cases in which pawnbrokers are 
approached. The items pawned were exclusively 
gold jewellery, and it appeared that many pawn-
brokers accept only items of gold, due to the 
relative ease of establishing their value 91. 
Pawnbroker loans were mostly used for working 
capital, and again debt repayment also played a 
very important role. These debts were accumu-
lated with moneylenders or banks. The original 
purpose of these primary loans was always for 
business; either for working capital or for invest-
ment purposes. Some entrepreneurs had 
approached a pawnbroker to obtain cash for a 
ROSCA contribution. One of these three used a 
ROSCA fund for lending-on purposes (money-
lender). One person used a loan to pay off in-kind 
debts with his input supplier. 
The major strengths emphasised by our interview 
partners are easy and immediate access to 
pawnbrokers in combination with quick 
disbursement of money. The procedures are very 
simple, as the conditions are regulated by the 
Pawnbrokers Act. In particular poor people 
without formal collateral (for bank loans) and 
without many social relations (for loans from 
family, friends or moneylenders) can benefit from 
the easy access offered by this source of credit. 
The weaknesses of pawning included high interest 
rates and the small amounts of money given for 
pawned items. 
                                                 
91 It is much more difficult to determine the value of gold 
than that of gems. Items other than jewels appear to be 
pawned only rarely. The bank pawning centres only 
accept gold. See Skully (1994). 
In general, pawnbrokers are very easy to 
approach, and they offer fixed terms and secure 
conditions. This explains why pawnbrokers are 
approached in cases of emergency. Their role is 
provis ion of short-term and small loans for urgent 
occasions, either in business or in the family. 
3.5 Credit Provision to SSEs 
The present section interprets the answers 
provided on our SSE questionnaires and focuses 
on the following two issues. First, the purposes for 
which SSEs approach various suppliers of loans. 
Second, remaining problems are discussed under 
the header “unsatisfied needs.” 
3.5.1 What Supplier is Approached for 
what Credit Purpose? 
SSEs in Sri Lanka have a certain set of different 
choices when they decide the answer the question: 
“Where to go to obtain what loan for what 
purpose?” The number of different credit 
suppliers among which an entrepreneur can 
choose depends on the purposes of the loan92. 
The wealthier and more formal an SSE, the more 
likely it is to have stable bank relations, banks 
being the preferred source of credit for the 
majority of credit needs. The more informal the 
                                                 
92 We assume that this set of opportunities is also 
influenced by other factors, such as the past and present 
economic situation of the business or the entrepreneur’s 
experiences with credit sources. However, we analysed 
only loan purpose as a decisive factor. 
Table 5: Characteristics of Pawnbroker Loans 
Loan Conditions: Average Median Maximum Minimum 
Loan Amount  27,500 LKR 12,000 LKR 200,000 LKR 3,000 LKR 
Interest Rate (p.m.) 3.7 % 3 % 12.5 % 1.5 % 
Repayment Period 8 months 12 months Generally 12 months 2 months 
Source: Authors’ survey 
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business and the more survival-oriented the SSE, 
the more informal credit suppliers tend to be 
approached. In general, all SSEs have a range of 
different suppliers that are easily accessible, 
namely pawnbrokers, family and friends, money-
lenders, ROSCAs and banks. Only highly 
indebted SSEs seem to have a very limited supply 
of credit and very little choice. 
Purposes of SSE Loans  
In analysing the role of individual credit suppliers, 
we came to the conclusion that the purpose of a 
loan is the most determinative factor. The purpose 
of a loan inherently determines a number of the 
conditions that should be fulfilled by the credit 
supplier. The various purposes for which SSEs 
approach different credit suppliers cannot be sepa-
rated distinctly. However, some preferences can 
be seen when we compare all loans for purpose 
and source. 
As far as business purposes are concerned, the 
three categories start-up, working capital and 
investment capital are served by different 
suppliers. Start-ups  are mainly financed by either 
family members and friends or banks. These two 
sources are able to provide money and seem to be 
willing to take the risk. As mentioned above, Sri 
Lanka’s banks provide credit for a number of 
particular start-up schemes. However, according 
to our information, it was difficult for entrepre-
neurs to satisfy requirements such as guarantors 
for loan schemes. 
Working capital is the principle reason to take 
out a loan. All credit suppliers play a role in 
meeting this need, and even in an equally impor-
tant manner. The most important loan condition is 
a certain flexibility in disbursement. 
By preference, investment capital is borrowed 
from banks and ROSCAs because these sources 
are able to provide the large amounts needed for 
planned occasions. As long as capital needs are 
not higher than LKR 100,000, moneylenders are 
approached. They provide the additional bonus of 
not caring too much about the purpose of a loan, 
which may mean that such money is used ille-
gally, e.g. for smuggling activities or illegal 
migration to the Middle East and Europe. 
For private loan needs , ROSCAs, moneylenders 
and pawnbrokers play the most important role. All 
sorts of consumption-related needs are met with 
the aid of ROSCA funds or by pawning an item. 
However, larger private investments such as 
house construction or purchase of a vehicle, which 
are not an ad hoc decision, are often financed by 
either banks or moneylenders. Pawnbrokers, with 
their immediate accessibility, also play a role in 
providing for emergency needs. 
Debt repayment played a very important role. 
Some of the SSEs interviewed were highly in 
debted and suffered from inadequate credit rela-
tions. Some entrepreneurs could not even tell us 
the amounts of their current loans and when they 
slipped into their “indebtedness trap.” They did 
not remember the first loan that started the chain 
leading to more and more expensive loans. 
Such cases partly explain the coexistence of 
formal and informal credits (Figure 3). Once they 
are unable to repay a bank loan, people approach 
informal sources such as moneylenders for funds 
to repay it. Struggling to meet the monthly interest 
payments on a moneylender loan, some entrepre-
neurs lost sight of their business cash flows and 
saw no way to repay their moneylender. One 
trader told us that when he failed to repay his 
moneylender, the moneylender forced him to 
partic ipate in his ROSCA in order to repay the 
loan. If during this time any kind of emergency 
occurs, the last exit available is to pawn one’s last 
items at a pawning centre or with a licensed 
pawnbroker. In such cases, indebted people have 
no choice of “where to go when,” and find them-
selves in a vicious circle involving more and more 
loans. Once in the circle, the next loan will 
predictably be at worse conditions. 
The reasons noted for indebtedness are as follows. 
Some SSEs may have overestimated their man-
agement and entrepreneurial capacity and even 
taken out too large loans to start up their business. 
Some SSEs were negatively affected by the 
economic depression during the last three years. 
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Some SSEs were simply poor and had little choice 
as to how to earn their living. In addition, in the 
informal financial sector lenders are not fully 
informed about other debts. Some moneylenders 
and ROSCA organisers seem to be well informed 
and make inquiries about a client’s indebtedness. 
Nevertheless, it is easier for an indebted person 
to obtain a loan in the informal sector. Some 
moneylenders increase the interest rate for such 
clients, since they are more risky to deal with. 
This business behaviour of moneylenders 
worsens the situation of indebted people. Since 
informal credit supplie rs act outside the legal 
system, there are, on the one hand, no laws and 
rules that forbid lending to indebted people. On 
the other hand, the formal sector lacks insolvency 
laws and advisory services for indebted people. 
Although SSEs have a choice between different 
credit suppliers, and a number of their needs are 
satisfied by formal and informal credit suppliers, 
many SSEs would prefer bank relations in the 
place of their relations with moneylenders and 
pawnbrokers. 
Figure 3: Example for a Highly Indebted Enterprise 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
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3.5.2 Unsatisfied Credit Needs of SSEs 
Even though SSEs have a choice between differ-
ent suppliers, they are often unable to satisfy their 
financial needs. Our results from Sri Lanka reveal 
that credits are needed for all purposes (start-ups, 
working-capital, investment). Prompt provision of 
credit is a major concern for many SSEs. Long 
and complicated procedures for bank credits is 
one reason for the important role of informal 
suppliers in financing SSEs. 
We distinguish credit needs according to type of 
credit and the purpose for which a credit is used. 
On the one hand, informal financial actors offer 
quick and easily accessible credit for the short 
term. Informal suppliers are more flexible con-
cerning collateral requirements than formal 
suppliers. However, credit conditions are insecure 
and interest rates are high. On the other hand, 
banks offer large credits for the long-term at 
moderate interest rates. However, transaction 
costs are high and the procedures are time-
consuming. In addition, banks require formal 
collateral or guarantors. There is therefore a need 
for quick, small and short-term credits at moderate 
interest rates for use for liquidity management or 
working capital or emergencies. Moreover, there 
is also a need for larger sums for longer periods, 
e.g. for start-ups or long-term investments. This 
means that both the informal and formal supply of 
credit needs to be improved. 
4 Supply: Informal Providers of Credit 
for SSEs 
The objective of the present chapter is to investi-
gate the main actors in the supply of informal 
credit: moneylenders and ROSCAs. They are 
presented with a view to their characteristics, 
strengths and weaknesses. 
4.1 The Credit Supply of Moneylenders 
to SSEs 
The role of moneylenders has long been the 
subject of a lively debate. The opinion dominant 
for many years was that moneylenders exploit 
borrowers and do more harm than good to 
national welfare. In recent years, however, the 
view has gained ground that moneylenders fulfil 
an important function in the economy in providing 
informal credit to SSEs and other clients. Today, 
positions are less contradictory, though opposing 
views still exist.93 
The picture presented in the literature did not 
make it clear whether moneylenders are an 
important source of credit for SSEs. Our empirical 
findings on moneylenders in Sri Lanka show that 
SSEs are prominent clients of the moneylenders in 
the sample. However, their credit supply is insuf-
ficient. On the one hand, moneylenders are 
important because they provide informal credit 
and their business practice includes certain 
strengths that correspond to the needs of SSEs. On 
the other hand, there are still major deficits in 
their credit supply to SSEs. 
4.1.1 Characteristics of Moneylenders  
As providers of informal credit, moneylenders are 
a heterogeneous group. The term moneylender is 
used in different ways, and there are different 
types of moneylenders.94 Figure 4 provides a 
typology of moneylenders based on five criteria 
used to structure their characteristics and to 
outline different types of moneylenders. 
The first criterion concerns lending within 
groups as opposed to lending to others . The 
present study applies the term moneylender only 
to the latter.95 The second criterion refers to the 
relationships between moneylenders and their 
clients, which may be of a commercial or non-
commercial nature. Non-commercial relations are 
not exclusively based on economic interests and  
                                                 
93 See Bolnick, (1992), p. 62; Germidis / Kessler / Meghir 
(1991), pp. 200-201 and pp. 206-207. 
94 See ADB (1990), pp. 190-199; von Pischke (1996), 
pp. 74-187; Sanderatne / Senanayake (1989), pp. 133-
141; Germidis / Kessler / Meghir (1991), pp. 158-164. 
95 See ADB (1990), p. 191; Sanderatne / Senanayake 
(1989), p. 134. 
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often rest on family relations. Social issues such 
as loyalty, kinship and solidarity play a decisive 
role, in part substituting for financial flows. The 
relations between lender and borrower are 
characterised by reciprocal responsibilities. The 
borrower may be bound to an implicit promise to 
help the lender if he is faced with a crisis or in 
need of liquidity. Family and friends often 
demand neither interest nor colla teral.96  
The third criterion is the characterisation of credit 
as untied or tied. Untied credits are lent and 
repaid – including interest – in cash. Tied credits 
are tied to another transaction between the 
borrower and the lender, for example the 
provision of inputs or the marketing of outputs. 
Either the credit or the repayment or both may be 
in kind (Box 3).97 
                                                 
96 See ADB (1990), p. 192; Adams (1992), p. 12; Fernando 
(1988), p. 257. 
97 See ADB (1990), pp. 192-193; Sanderatne and 
Senanayake (1989) use the terms direct and indirect 
lending, but the idea is basically the same. 
The fourth criterion is whether moneylenders lend 
as their main occupation or whether they lend 
only as a sideline. Lending is the main activity of 
professional mone ylenders . Non-professional 
untied moneylenders98 lend only on the side. 
Normally, non-professional moneylenders, who 
for example provide tied credits, are mainly shop-
keepers, merchants, artisans, employees, landlords 
or farmers (Box 4).99 
The more important the moneylending business. 
the more professional the moneylenders. One 
indicator for the importance of moneylending 
business is the number of employees involved in a 
lending business and the amount of money lent 
out by it. For example, a large-scale moneylender 
in Ja Ela stated that moneylending was not his 
main business, but according to our criteria this 
moneylender was nevertheless highly profes-
sional. His loan sizes were the highest in our 
overall sample: the maximum volume being LKR 
2,000,000. 
                                                 
98 For convenience, they will be referred to as non-
professional moneylenders, although tied and the non-
commercial moneylenders are also non-professional 
lenders. 
99 See Germidis / Kessler / Meghir (1991), p. 41; 
Sanderatne and Senanayake (1989)use the terms 
professional and semi-professional moneylenders. The 
ADB (1990) uses the terms regular and intermittent 
moneylenders. 
Box 3: Tied Credits in Sri Lanka 
The four tied moneylenders we interviewed lend to SSEs 
who buy their inputs on credit. One example is a welder 
who buys all his materials for contract work at a retail shop 
in Kandy. Once the welder has finished his job and his 
customer has paid him, he repays his credit to the retail 
shop, i.e. his tied moneylender.  
Interest rates of the tied moneylenders interviewed range 
between 3 and 7 % p.m. Like untied moneylenders, tied 
moneylenders are flexible in their borrower selection. This 
is mainly based on trust and “history.” All four of our tied 
moneylenders know their customers and are thus familiar 
with their repayment capacity. Tied credit is thus made 
available very promptly to borrowers who are already 
known to the lender. New borrowers have to build up a 
good reputation before they can  obtain a tied credit. Debt 
with a supplier means that the borrower (and customer) has 
a continuing relationship with the lender which may lead to 
new sales. None of our tied moneylenders used illegal 
practices, and SEEs who have used tied credit are as a rule 
highly satisfied with it. To sum up, tied moneylending may 
not always be strictly defined as moneylending, but it can 
be seen as a conventional business relationship. 
Source: Interviews with tied moneylenders and SSEs in 
Kandy, Negombo and Maskeliya 
Box 4: A Non-Professional Moneylender 
A grocery store owner in Upcott, near Maskeliya, lends 
between LKR 1,000 and 10,000 at interest rates of 6-8 % to 
26 clients and provides tied credits to estate labourers. Even 
though his main business is his grocery store, 
moneylending is more profitable than the grocery business. 
To assess the two types of business, he keeps two sets of 
accounts, even though these are difficult to keep separate. 
He has employees who sometimes assist in collecting 
repayments. In such cases, the costs involved are 
impossible to measure because these persons are paid as 
shop assistants. His lending  activity thus does not differ 
substantially from that of moneylenders who consider 
themselves professional or full-time moneylenders. 
Source: Interview with a moneylender near Maskeliya 
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Figure 4: Typology of Moneylenders 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation, based on ADB (1990), pp. 190-199 and Sanderatne / Senanayake (1989) 
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4.1.2 Strengths of Moneylenders  
Three specific strengths, found in previous 
studies, explain the attractiveness of moneylend-
ers for SSEs: flexible borrower selection, low 
transaction costs, and quick access to credit. 
These strengths are often interlinked and 
sometimes difficult to separate. 
4.1.2.1 Flexible Borrower Selection 
According to Sanderatne et al., all types of 
moneylenders base their decision to lend on the 
borrower’s overall repayment capacity, including 
his ability to provide collateral, and not on the 
specific purpose of the credit. As a result, 
moneylenders in Sri Lanka are willing to extend 
credit for production- and for consumption-related 
purposes.100 
Trust and Control 
Moneylenders use two major mechanisms to 
reduce their credit risk: trust and control. In 
practice, these mechanisms are not mutually 
exclusive, and may even be complementary. 
According to our interviews, the flexibility of 
borrower selection varies, with some money-
lenders demanding substantial collateral and 
others not demanding any security apart from 
trust. In general, however, borrower selection is 
                                                 
100 See Sanderatne / Senanayake (1989), p. 150 and pp. 154-
155. 
an efficient instrument of risk management and is 
mainly based on the borrower’s overall repayment 
capacity. 
Trust, experience and personal knowledge of the 
borrower play an important role when the 
moneylender assesses his clients. Previous bor-
rower repayment records and long-standing rela -
tions are important criteria for the assessment of 
clients.101 Our interviews showed that in Sri Lanka 
trust and personal knowledge are also important 
for most credit transactions of moneylenders. 
Trust can be based on family relations as well as 
on “friendship.“ For example, if a moneylender 
borrows money from another moneylender or the 
bank, he usually lends it on at an interest rate 1 % 
p.m. higher than the interest rate that he himself 
pays. Family members are not required to pay this 
extra interest. 
Apart from family members, “friends“ also enjoy 
some privileges based on trust. “Friends“ are often 
required to pay lower interest rates and are given 
higher loans than new clients. Some 
moneylenders even stated that they lend only to 
friends. Our results show that “friends” are more 
likely to be defined by their good repayment 
performance - and therefore their role as “good 
clients” - than by their personal relationship to the 
moneylender. This can be illustrated by several 
                                                 
101 See Christen (1989), pp. 22-23; ADB (1990), p. 192; 
Germidis / Kessler / Meghir (1991), p. 164; Adams 
(1994), p. 3. 
Box 5: Borrower Selection of two Moneylenders in Sri Lanka 
One of the female moneylenders we interviewed is not aware and not interested in the purpose of the loans she provides to her 
borrowers. She lives in a small neighbourhood of fishermen in Negombo and only lends to people from this neighbourhood, i.e. 
mainly to fishermen. She assumes that these fishermen need the money to buy nets or for emergencies, but she does not ask them. 
She lends to them, mostly without collateral, because she is familiar with their financial situation. If she has any doubt, she 
demands collateral. Another moneylender from Negombo town knows all his borrowers from the market. He knows when they 
need money for their businesses or an emergency, but this makes no difference to him and it is not a criterion for his borrower 
selection. However, when he sees another moneylender visit one of his potential clients, he knows they have not repaid an 
instalment on a loan. They are then automatically excluded from his circle of borrowers. The two examples illustrate that the 
purpose of a loan is as a rule not of interest to the moneylender. It is legitimate to borrow for consumption purposes or for an emer-
gency, the main thing is that the borrower's repayment capacity is estimated to be good enough. 
Source: Interviews conducted in Negombo 
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cases in which “good clients“ became “friends“ 
because of their good repayment performance. 
However, this “friendship“ continues only as long 
as the rules are obeyed, i.e. it lasts until as the loan 
is repaid. 
Another element of trust is knowledge. Personal 
knowledge of a person and experience with his 
repayment record contribute to building trust. One 
criterion for borrower selection may be geo-
graphical distance. For example, one moneylender 
lends exclusively to people living in his village. 
Knowledge is built through good customer re-
lations, especially where moneylenders own a 
shop and know their borrowers as customers or as 
neighbouring shop owners. Of course, knowledge 
and information-gathering are also an instrument 
of control and automatically lower transaction 
costs. 
Where trust is not sufficient, borrower selection is 
complemented by control. Moneylenders in Sri 
Lanka use collateral as security for their loans.102 
The lender does not distinguish between the assets 
of an enterprise and the belongings of a house-
hold. Collateral may consist of moveable goods, 
such as jewellery and gold, or durable consumer 
goods, immovable property or inventory and 
equipment.103 
Our empirical findings indicate that land, vehicle 
papers and cheques (mostly post-dated) are the 
most popular forms of collateral among the 
moneylenders in our sample. Some moneylenders 
also use jewellery or what they call “blank sheets” 
as security, the latter being a empty sheet of paper 
signed by the borrower on which the lender can 
write a contract of his own as an instrument to 
ensure repayment. This is merely a means of 
exerting psychological pressure, and none of our 
interviewees had ever had to use it. The question 
of how moneylenders gain access to collateral in 
cases of default could not be answered because 
default was very rare amongst our sample. In Sri 
Lanka, promissory notes are legally enforceable: 
                                                 
102 Sanderatne (1980), p. 13. 
103 See Sanderatne / Senanayake (1989), pp. 150-151. 
the Mediation Board, a semi-formal institution for 
conflict resolution at local level, settles loan 
disputes and accepts written contracts or promis-
sory notes by moneylenders and their clients as 
evidence. However, this is only the case if both 
parties agree to mediation. 
Sometimes a guarantor can be used to make up for 
lack of trust or knowledge of the borrower. A 
guarantor may either provide information about a 
borrower or have more successful means than the 
moneylender to induce him to repay. In this case, 
the moneylender pays a commission to the 
guarantor. However, the guarantor does not bail 
out the borrower in case of default.104 In Sri Lanka 
we found that guarantors can operate as “introdu-
cers” of new clients to moneylenders. For 
example, one moneylender in Negombo accepts 
only new borrowers that are introduced by old 
clients. The old client acts as a guarantor for the 
new one and even assumes responsibility for the 
new client's first loan. Sometimes the old client 
may even take the loan and then pass it on to the 
new client. Usually, the new client would not have 
to pay the old client for this service; but even if he 
were required to, this fact would be of no interest 
to the moneylender. 
Moneylenders achieve high repayment ratios 
because they have credible means to sanction 
default. The consequence of having no access to 
credit for future needs of his SSE is an important 
incentive for a borrower to repay.105 We identified 
a variety of sanction mechanisms used by 
moneylenders in Sri Lanka to deal with defaulters 
and delayers. The border between default – 
ultimate non-repayment – and delay is a fluid one. 
The moneylender and the specific situation 
involved determine the point of time at which a 
loan is considered “lost“ as well as the time it 
might be worthwhile to seek to recover it. 
Sanctions are one way of enforcing repayment. 
They can be broken down into preventive 
                                                 
104 See Christen (1989), p. 22; von Pischke (1996), p. 177; 
Germidis / Kessler / Meghir (1991), p. 164. 
105 See Christen (1989), Krahnen / Schmidt (1994), p. 37; 
p. 25; Adams (1994), p. 3; Zander (1994), p. 4. 
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measures and measures to enforce repayment or to 
“punish“ default. 
Preventive sanctions  include the elements 
analysed above: social and physical control of 
borrowers. Some moneylenders use contracts, 
which may be written instruments signed before a 
lawyer or have the form of a blank sheet of paper 
which the borrower is required to sign. 
Repayment is enforced in different ways. Some 
moneylenders openly admitted that they 
physically threaten borrowers who do not repay 
on time. Another scenario is informal co-
operation of moneylenders with the police. In 
addition, moneylenders use the Mediation Board, 
a local level governmental dispute-settlement 
institution, to enforce the repayment of loans. One 
moneylender, for example, settled a loan dispute 
with a borrower by referring the matter to the 
Mediation Board. The agreement brokered by the 
Mediation Board specified that the borrower had 
to repay the loan with less interest than originally 
was agreed upon. 
The most common sanction used by moneylenders 
appears to be exclusion from credit. This is a 
severe problem for the potential defaulter because 
in most cases it means that he will never again be 
able to obtain a loan from any moneylender in the 
area. This mechanism may also be used by the 
moneylender to set an example for other 
borrowers and to prevent future defaults. 
4.1.2.2 Low Transaction Costs 
Our second hypothesis was that one major 
strength of moneylenders is their ability to operate 
with very low transaction costs in specific circum-
stances. However, in the literature there are some 
opposing views about the transaction costs of 
lenders, which depend on some of the 
characteristics of lending, e.g. type of money-
lender, type of the contract, etc.106 
                                                 
106 See Robinson (2001), pp. 193-196. 
Transaction costs involve information costs as 
well as the costs of the physical act of delivering 
the credit and obtaining repayment. Information 
costs normally include identification of the 
borrower, collection and verification of applica-
tion documents, assessment of collateral, follow-
up and monitoring. The most important compo-
nents of costs for employees are transport costs 
and the opportunity costs involved in travel 
time.107 
This strength of moneylenders is confirmed by 
our interviews. The transaction costs of the 
sample of moneylenders interviewed can be 
broken down roughly into information costs, 
collection and transport costs, time costs in 
general and costs of employees or agents. 
However, it must be stressed that our findings on 
costs are difficult to measure. All costs are to a 
certain extent interlinked. Information gathering is 
often done in the process of collecting repay-
ments. Sometimes an employee or broker does 
this job, saving the moneylender time and receiv-
ing a commission for it. 
As regards the costs of information gathering, it 
has been explained above that this factor is mostly 
relevant for new clients. New clients have to be 
checked to assess their repayment capacity. These 
costs include transport costs and time costs. If the 
borrower offers collateral, the moneylender also 
has to check the validity of the collateral offered. 
Land titles, for example, can be checked with the 
land registration authority. However, land titles 
are often not registered, a factor which poses 
major problems for borrowers and lenders alike. 
Some moneylenders told us that information-
gathering costs tend to be low because they know 
most of their clients from their shop or their 
neighbourhood. However, it is rather difficult to 
measure exact costs for information-gathering. 
Collection costs vary among moneylenders. Some 
moneylenders have few repayment collection 
costs because their main job makes it possible for 
                                                 
107 See McGuire / Conroy (1997), p. 8. 
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them to collect payments in the course of work 
(bus drivers, milkmen etc.). Others have transport, 
time, and wage costs. Some moneylenders drive 
to their clients and collect repayments on their 
own and others send an employee from their main 
business or a broker to collect repayments. 
The time factor involved in moneylending is 
further taken into account in assessing transaction 
costs. We have to distinguish here between 
moneylenders who engage in moneylending as an 
additional business and those whose main 
business is moneylending. Those with another 
major business spend less time on lending. Often 
the two businesses are interlinked, and the time 
spent on each business is difficult to specify. Most 
transactions take place at the moneylenders’ main 
business, a shop or grocery store. The time factor 
is thus very low in these cases. 
Moneylenders who clearly lend money as a major 
business devote the better part of their day to 
lending. We must further distinguish here between 
large-scale moneylenders and those engaged in 
more or less small-scale lending. 108 The first type 
is more likely to use a broker or co-ordinator to 
find new clients and to collect repayments. Our 
results show that the eight moneylenders with the 
highest loan volume (above LKR 100,000) have at 
least one person working for them. This person 
may be a lawyer or a broker. Brokers usually 
receive a commission of about 1 % of the interest 
on a loan. Less professional moneylenders often 
use an employee from their shop for their lending 
business. 
4.1.2.3 Quick Access to Credit 
Our third hypothesis was that moneylenders 
provide quick access to credit. From the 
borrower’s point of view, the important 
consideration is whether the moneylender 
provides quick access to credit or the borrower is 
able to obtain credit only from time to time. 
                                                 
108 Moneylenders whose maximum loan volume is up to 
LKR 100,000 are considered to be small-scale lenders. 
Professional moneylenders provide credit when 
other types of moneylenders refuse it, and access 
to their loans is comparatively easy.109 According 
to many authors, all types of moneylenders 
usually provide credit almost instantly because 
they have intimate knowledge of their clients and 
do not need to spend time collecting information. 
According to Sanderatne, this is also true for Sri 
Lanka. Quick access to credit can be crucial for 
SSEs because otherwise they may miss business 
opportunities that are only temporarily available 
and thus incur costs for forgone profits.110 
This hypothesis was confirmed only in part and 
needs to be modified. It became clear that “good 
clients” have very fast access to money because 
the relevant information is already available. 
While new clients have to be “checked” first, 
well-known clients who have good records and do 
not need to be rechecked obtain their loans within 
a period of five minutes to three days at the most. 
New customers sometimes have to wait until the 
moneylender has gathered sufficient information 
on the borrower's financial situation and reputa-
tion. This can take up to four weeks. Still, this is 
much faster than a bank loan. The average time-
span between application for a bank loan and loan 
disbursement is, according to our interviews, 2-3 
months. 
4.1.3 Weaknesses of Moneylenders  
As mentioned above, moneylenders not only have 
strengths, they also have weaknesses. These 
weaknesses affect their lending to SSEs in a 
negative way. Three weaknesses are of high 
relevance here: high interest rates, lack of constant 
access and access to large and long-term loans, 
and inadequate legal enforceability. 
                                                 
109 See Robinson (2001), p. 185; Zander (1994), p. 5. 
110 See Christen (1989), p. 17. von Pischke (1996), p. 185; 
Sanderatne / Senanayake (1989), p. 132; ADB (1990), 
p. 192; Zander (1994), p. 6. 
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4.1.3.1 High Interest Rates and Low 
Competition 
High interest rates have always been regarded as 
the major problem associated with moneylenders’ 
activ ities. Today the debate has become more 
diverse. One prominent view is still that money-
lenders exploit their borrowers by charging high 
interest rates. The opposing view maintains that 
moneylenders charge a fair price for the product 
they provide. In addition, there is a continuum of 
more differentiated views in between.111 
Accordingly, two questions have to be answered 
for our study: First, are the interest rates of 
moneylenders’ that lend to SSEs in Sri Lanka 
high? Second, what is the reason for this – or, 
more specifically, can interest levels be explained 
by a lack of competition? 
Interest Rates 
Surveys and field studies from Sri Lanka show 
that the interest rates charged by moneylenders 
vary greatly. Table 6 lists the results of these 
surveys and field studies. However, most of the 
information is based on surveys which date back 
to the 1970s and 1980s and were conducted 
mainly in rural Sri Lanka, excluding urban areas. 
Only Sanderatne / Senanayake (1989) provide 
information on moneylending to small enterprises. 
They estimate that smaller business are required 
to pay an interest rate of 3-5 % monthly. 
Table 6 shows that a large part of the loans 
provided by moneylenders are disbursed at very 
low interest rates, or even interest-free, while at 
the same time there is a large segment in the range 
of more than 100 % annually. Less expensive 
loans are extended mainly by non-commercial 
moneylenders such as relatives and friends. 
                                                 
111 See Bolnick (1992), p. 62; Germidis / Kessler / Meghir 
(1991), pp. 200-201, pp. 206-207; Robinson (2001), pp. 
177-182. 
Professional moneylenders charge the highest 
rates.112 
These findings were in the main confirmed by our 
study. Family and friends were an important 
source of credit for our SSEs. These loans were 
provided without interest. Typical interest rates 
vary between 5 % and 10 % monthly. However, 
they can range much higher, as is shown by one 
example in which credit was provided to about 
300 shopkeepers at an interest rate of about 17 % 
monthly. 
Thus, considering that moneylenders tend to have 
low transaction costs and low default rates, the 
answer to the first question is that the interest 
rates that moneylenders charge for SSE credits are 
in fact high. Even if inflation (about 9 % p.a. on 
average in 1996-2000113) is taken into account, a 
nominal interest rate of 5 % monthly means a real 
rate of 53 % p.a. This leads us to the second 
question: Are these high interest rates based on a 
lack of competition? 
Competition 
In the literature one criterion used to measure the 
degree of competition among moneylenders is 
borrower mobility, which is bound up with a 
certain borrower dependency that makes it virtu-
ally impossible for the borrower to switch from 
one moneylender to another. Another criterion is 
the number of potential moneylenders in a given 
area, often very limited because many people lack 
either the funds to lend or the necessary 
information about borrowers.114 
We went beyond the literature and used three 
different criteria to assess the degree of competi- 
 
                                                 
112 See Sanderatne (1992), p. 89; Zander (1994), p. 5; 
Fernando (1988), p. 255. 
113 See http://www.economist.com/countries/SriLanka/pro-
file.cfm?folder=Profile-FactSheet. 
114 See Germidis / Kessler / Meghir (1991), p. 180; Schrader 
(1992), p. 78; Bolnick (1992); p. 57, p. 63; Robinson 
(2001), p. 184. 
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Table 6: Overview of Empirical Studies on the Interest Rates of Moneylenders  
Interest rates in the informal sector – I 
Nominal interest rate (p.a.): Credit volume in % of total credit: 
0 % 54 % 
0-20 % 14.6 % 
20-100 % 7.0 % 
Survey: Central Bank of Ceylon, Survey 
of Credit and Indebtedness among 
Paddy Farmers, 1979  
Source: Sanderatne (1992), p. 92 
100-... % 24.3 % 
Interest rates in the informal sector – II 
Nominal interest rate (p.a.): Credit volume in  
% of total credit 
Real interest rate 
(p.a.): 
0 % 42.9 % - 12.4 % 
0-30 % 20.3 % - 12.4-13 % 
30-100 % 18.1 % 13-75 % 
Survey: Central Bank of Ceylon, 
Report on Consumer Finance and 
Socio Economic Survey, 1981/82 
Source: Fernando (1992), p. 252 
100-... % 18.7 % 75-... % 
Interest rates of professional moneylenders 
Nominal interest rate (p.a.): Credit volume in % of total credit: 
0-11 % 6.6 % 
11-25 % 42.4 % 
25-100 % 42.6 % 
Survey: Central Bank of Ceylon, Survey 
of Credit and Indebtedness among 
Paddy Farmers, 1976. 
Source: Fernando (1992), p. 255 
100-... % 8.4 % 
Average interest rates on loans and deposits (p.a.) 
Type of lender: Semi -urban Mabodale Remote Rural 
Makkaduwawe 
Friends / relatives 0 % 0 % 
Professional ML 151 % p.a. 165 % p.a. 
Survey: Two field studies in 
Mabodale and Makkaduwawe 
(1990). 
Source: Zander (1994), p. 5 
Traders 50 % p.a. 0 % 
Urban Moneylenders  
Interest rates are mostly per month or day. 
Petty traders pay about 10 % per day.  
For direct lending, small and medium-sized enterprises pay 3-5 % p.m. 
Source: Sanderatne / 
Senanayake (1989), p. 132 
For non-direct loans, larger enterprises pay 5-10 % p.m. 
Professional Moneylenders 
Survey: One hundred questionnaires in each of four villages 
and towns. 
Source: Olsen (2001), p. 24 
Typical interest rates are 10, 20, or 30 % p.m. 
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tion among moneylenders in the areas under 
consideration. The first criterion is borrower 
mobility, i.e. the opportunity to switch from one 
moneylender to another or to use various money-
lenders at the same time. The second criterion is 
interest rate differentials in a given area. In this 
case, it has to be taken into account that not all 
moneylenders provide identical products – a 
factor that may explain different prices (interest 
rates) – and that it is quite difficult to obtain a 
clear notion of the limits of borrower mobility in a 
given area. As a third criterion, we analysed the 
choice of a first-time borrower made by 
different moneylenders. 
The mobility of moneylenders’ clients  is limited, 
and this creates space for monopolistic practices. 
There is only limited competition for clients who 
are already considered to be the client of another 
moneylender. The moneylenders from our sample 
explained that a client does not switch from “his” 
moneylender to another moneylender. When 
moneylenders talked about “their” clients, they 
meant not only clients borrowing from them but 
also the fact that “clients belong exclusively to 
one moneylender.” The issue can be illustrated by 
an example: One moneylender told us that there 
are five moneylenders in her village. However, 
moneylender A would never accept moneylender 
B’s clients. In a similar sense, another money-
lender noted that every moneylender has his own 
set of clients and rejects the clients of other 
moneylenders. 
These statements demonstrate that once a relation-
ship to a client has been established, a money-
lender considers him to be “his” client and other 
moneylenders will be reluctant accept him as a 
borrower. There is an interesting case which 
illustrates the respect accorded to these “rights” to 
a client: A moneylender works with a broker who 
introduces new clients to him. The broker charges 
the client 1 % interest p.m. in addition to the 
moneylender’s interest rate. After some months or 
years, the moneylender will be able to judge the 
client’s repayment capacity by himself, but he will 
never give him direct access – saving him the 
broker’s 1 % – because this is, and must remain, 
the broker’s contact. Clearly, there are other 
reasons not to accept other moneylenders’ 
customers, e.g. low client repayment capacity. 
Even though moneylenders do not break into 
existing moneylender-borrower relationships, 
moneylenders are still in effect forced to abide by 
certain criteria of competitiveness. Otherwise they 
risk losing clients, for example if one money-
lender increases his interest rates. Consequently 
there are limits on the room for monopolistic 
manoeuvre. In order to avoid losing clients, one 
moneylender pawned some of his property to 
increase his fund. Another moneylender states: “If 
you are fair, borrowers come to you.” If he 
charged higher interest rates, he would be in 
danger of losing his clients. Similarly, one 
moneylender states that although every money-
lender has his own set of clients, competition from 
5-6 moneylenders in Maskeliya prevents him from 
raising his interest rates. 
Many moneylenders express the idea of a certain 
standard of competitiveness by distinguishing 
between two types of moneylenders with regard to 
their interest rates. Two of them claim that 
borrowers will first try to obtain credit from 
moneylenders who charge about 5 % interest p.m.. 
These customers will approach “those expensive 
moneylenders” only if they are rejected by the 
first type.  
The second criterion – interest rate differentials 
– confirms that there is in fact room for monopo-
listic practices. Interest rates vary between 2-8 % 
in Maskeliya, 2.5-10 % in Negombo, or 3-10 % in 
Nuwara Eliya. Although it is difficult to establish 
exact geographical limits of borrower mobility, 
the existing interest rate differentials are an indi-
cation of a lower level of competition. 
As regards the third criterion – the choice of a 
first-time borrower by different moneylenders 
– analysis of our empirical results show that 
competition is not only a matter of opportunities 
to change financial providers, but also a matter of 
the choice of a first provider. In this case compe-
tition appears to be stronger and room for 
monopolistic practices smaller. A statement made 
by one interviewee demonstrates the way in which 
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competition for new clients may influence 
moneylender business practices: “Yes, once a new 
client wanted to get a loan for 4 % instead of 5 %. 
I rejected. However, then I changed my mind and 
offered the client 4 % interest rate for his loan.“ 
Another moneylender maintains that he is strict 
with his rates, not lowering them for anybody. Yet 
at the same time he confirms that there is compe-
tition by stating that “borrowers ask various 
moneylenders before taking a credit.” Moreover, 
the fact that moneylenders seek contacts with new 
clients supports the observation that there is a 
certain measure of competition for good new 
clients. 
However, competition for new clients does not 
imply that every borrower has the same range of 
choices, or indeed any choices at all. Customers 
who are not considered good clients may be 
forced to enter into a credit relationship with one 
of “those expensive moneylenders.” Moreover, 
degree of remoteness and diversity of contacts 
also play a role in a borrower’s freedom of choice. 
In this case, regional differences come into the 
picture. For some of the tea estate workers around 
Maskeliya, the moneylender was the only contact 
to the world outside the tea estate, and this of 
course means a considerable reduction of compe-
tition. 
This confirms the view of the Asian Development 
Bank that moneylenders perform the function of a 
„lender of last resort“115 for borrowers who do 
not have access to credits from other sources. 
Consequently, often poorer people and sometimes 
SSEs have to pay the highest interest rates.116 This 
is also the finding of another field study which has 
been recently conducted in Sri Lanka.117 
To sum up, interest rates of moneylenders are 
high and may be explained in part by lack of 
competition. However, there is some competition 
                                                 
115 ADB (1990), p. 192. 
116 See von Pischke (1996), p. 184; ADB (1990), pp. 195-
196. 
117 See Olsen (2001), p. 24. 
among moneylenders, particularly competition for 
new good clients. 
4.1.3.2 Access: Lack of Constant Supply 
and of Large Long-term Credits 
One of their weaknesses is that moneylenders are 
unable to provide either constant access to credit 
or large and long-term credits. One feature 
common to all types of moneylenders is that they 
use their own personal funds for lending, and 
these are limited and at times unavailable. Unlike 
banks, they generally do not have other people’s 
saving deposits at their disposal. It is therefore 
argued that moneylenders as individuals are not a 
reliable constant source of credit.118 However, 
there are also people who take out formal loans 
and use them for informal on-lending.119 
The empirical results confirm this weakness, but 
our explanations go far beyond the literature. Two 
questions derive from these considerations: First, 
does the volume of funds available to 
moneylenders in Sri Lanka constitute a crucial 
constraint which leads to unsteady access to credit 
or a lack of large and long-term credit? Second, 
do moneylenders in Sri Lanka rely exclusively on 
their own funds or do they have access to other 
sources of finance? 
Concerning the first question, our interviews 
showed that the financial resources available were 
perceived by most moneylenders as a major 
constraint for their moneylending business. 
Although most moneylenders have access to other 
sources of finance, they are sometimes unable to 
satisfy the credit needs of their clients for lack of 
sufficient funds. If they do not have the necessary 
                                                 
118 See Ledgerwood (1999), pp. 93-94; Christen (1989), 
p. 15; ADB (1990), p. 188. 
119 See Schrader (1992), p. 78; ADB (1990), p. 191. 
Sanderatne / Senanayake (1989), p. 131 also report that 
urban moneylenders act as financial intermediaries, 
taking small savings and lending larger sums. Also, in 
our sample one moneylender took the pension fond of 
tea estate workers as savings, paying 4 % in monthly 
interest and lending from these sums smaller credits at 7-
8 % monthly interest. 
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funds available, moneylenders often offer a 
volume smaller than the sum requested, or access 
may be delayed because the moneylender has to 
wait for another borrower’s repayment, or the 
moneylender may need time to obtain the money 
elsewhere. 
Limited financial resources are also the reason 
why credit is provided only for the short term. By 
fixing shorter periods moneylenders can better 
control their money: a moneylender can decide 
either to prolong the credit period – as often 
requested by borrowers – or to call on the 
borrower to repay the credit. Although money-
lenders can be quite flexible with their repayment 
periods, there is no fixed time horizon for the 
borrower. 
Compared with data on the volumes and periods 
of bank loans to SSEs, the findings of the 
qualitative analysis of our interviews with 
moneylenders on the fund constraint as well as on 
credit volumes and periods are also confirmed by 
the more quantitative results of our SSE 
interviews. These are summarised in Table 7. 
Whereas the evidence on the first question 
indicates that there is a fund constraint, the 
findings of the interviews on the second question 
outline some of the dimensions of the problem. It 
is not simply a problem of be ing limited to their 
own personal funds – moneylenders do use other 
financial sources for their business – but 
nevertheless their financial capacity remains 
limited. 
Apart from their own personal funds – and 
moneylenders do usually not keep separate 
accounts for their official main business and their 
moneylending activities – moneylenders use 
banks and ROSCAs as sources of finance and they 
exchange funds with other moneylenders. 
Banks  provide moneylenders with funds either 
through loans or through overdrafts. For example, 
one moneylender informed his bank that he 
needed a loan for his shop; and he later used the loan 
for his moneylending business. Similarly, another 
interviewee obtained a loan of LKR 200,000 which 
is now the working capital of his jewellery shop 
and his moneylending business alike. Another 
moneylender obtained an even larger bank loan of 
LKR 1,000,000 at an interest rate of 2.5 % p.m.; 
he also lends the money on. 
Bank overdrafts are used by moneylenders mainly 
as “a buffer for lending.” Although there are no 
exact figures for all interviewees, two examples 
may serve to illustrate the issue: One moneylender 
has an overdraft limit of LKR 100,000, whereas 
the other’s overdraft limit is LKR 40,000. Both 
use their overdrafts for moneylending. The 
importance of overdrafts is also confirmed by 
moneylenders who are without one: one example 
is a moneylender who wishes he had an overdraft 
in order to be able to satisfy additional demand for 
credit, while another moneylender complains that 
the bank has cancelled his overdraft. However, 
not all moneylenders who have an overdraft use it 
for lending. Some moneylenders we interviewed 
Table 7: Credit Volumes and Lending Periods: Moneylenders as Compared with Banks 
Credit volume Credit period 
24 SSE loans from MLs:  
Median = LKR 25,000 
21 loans ?  LKR 50,000 
3 loans ?  LKR 50,000 
22 SSE loans from MLs:  
8 loans = not fixed  
10 loans ?  6 months 
4 loans ?  6 months 
26 SSE loans from banks:  
Median = LKR 205,000 
10 loans ?  LKR 50,000 
16 loans ?  LKR 50,000 
25 SSE loans from banks: 
Average = 36 months 
4 loans ?  6 months 
21 loans ?  6 months 
Source: Author’s survey 
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have a bank overdraft, but they do not use it for 
lending because the risk posed by defaulting or 
delaying clients is too high. In these cases 
moneylending is not likely to be the first priority 
of the respective moneylenders, and they prefer to 
preserve good relations with their bank for other 
business needs or important consumption-related 
spending. 
The main advantage of refinancing through banks 
is obviously the low interest rate, which leaves a 
profit margin for the moneylender, or which may 
even be passed on to the borrower without loosing 
competitiveness. One major disadvantage, 
however, is that banks are less flexible with 
repayment than other sources. One moneylender 
borrows from a “friend” – probably another 
moneylender – and from a bank to refinance his 
moneylending business. However, he prefers the 
“friend” because the bank is very strict on repay-
ment and he must anticipate difficulties if a 
borrower delays repayment. 
ROSCAs  are used by moneylenders - either as 
members or as organisers - to refinance their 
lending. Two of our interviewees are members in 
three different ROSCAs, and both use the funds 
for lending. Another moneylender is a member in 
five auction ROSCAs and bids for funds in one of 
them “when a trustworthy client needs credit.” 
Being a member in more than one ROSCA is 
clearly an advantage for moneylenders, because 
this enables them to avoid having to bid for an 
early fund. Bidding early for funds involves high 
costs. In order to avoid an early bid, a money-
lender has to choose ROSCAs whose starting 
dates are distributed evenly over the year. 
Three of the moneylenders interviewed are 
ROSCA organisers. One source of finance for 
them is that, as ROSCA organisers, they can 
obtain the first or the second fund without bidding 
and can use this fund for lending. In addition, the 
contributions are sometimes collected well ahead 
of the distribution of the fund, and the ROSCA 
organiser can lend on these contributions in the 
meantime. However, the contributions can be used 
only for short-term credits of up to one month at 
the maximum because the moneylender has to 
disburse the fund every month to one of the 
members. 
Generally , membership in a ROSCA corresponds 
very well with the liquidity needs of 
moneylenders. A moneylender’s incoming cash 
flows consist of small regular interest payments 
and his outgoing cash flows tend to be larger, 
irregular sums. This case is reversed for a ROSCA 
member. His outgoing cash flows are small 
regular contributions to the ROSCA, and his 
incoming cash flows are large, irregular sums 
across the overall cycle. 
Nevertheless, there are also some costs involved 
in participation in a ROSCA. Although ROSCA 
membership is not very time-consuming, 
membership in three or more ROSCAs definitely 
entails some time-related opportunity costs. 
Moreover, bidding is sometimes in an early phase 
of the cycle, and this leads to high implicit interest 
rates. 
Various statements of interviewees show how the 
exchange of funds between moneylenders is 
organised. One moneylender refers to an instance 
in which she refinanced another moneylender, and 
another moneylender has offered her the same 
service. One other moneylender has an arrange-
ment that allows him to use other moneylenders’ 
funds for a commission of 0.5-1 % p.m. The same 
applies for a third moneylender. He is able to 
obtain funds from other moneylenders at a rate of 
3-4 % p.m. Often moneylenders speak of giving a 
fund to so-called brokers for on-lending. There are 
different profit-sharing arrangements for the co-
operation between moneylender and broker. The 
moneylender may charge his normal rate, with the 
broker adding something between 1 % and 5 % 
p.m., or the moneylender may lend to the broker 
at a preferential rate about 1 % lower than his 
normal rate, and again the broker will add his 
profit margin. However, access at a rate of 0.5-
1 % p.m. is an exception. 
Access to other moneylenders’ funds extends a 
moneylender’s lending capacity beyond his own 
personal funds. The need for the lending 
moneylender to co-operate is bound up with the 
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fact that although he has the funds, he may not 
have the contacts he needs to lend to a client. 
What this means is that exchanging funds is a 
reasonable and profitable strategy for both parties 
concerned. In addition, it also means better access 
for borrowers.120 
These various sources of finance show that on the 
one hand moneylenders are able to extend their 
financial capacity beyond the limits of their own 
personal funds. On the other hand, it also demon-
strates that financial resources are scarce for 
moneylenders as well. Their funds are therefore 
often not sufficient to guarantee constant access to 
credit or to provide large and long-term credits. 
4.1.3.3 Lack of Legal Enforceability  
As actors of the informal financial sector, 
moneylenders usually have no access to legal 
institutions. Thus they lack the legal means to 
enforce repayment of their credits. This is 
considered a weakness of moneylenders because it 
has negative impacts on borrowers. Borrowers are 
more directly affected if the moneylender uses 
threats (and acts) of violence in the place of legal 
enforcement.121 The effects are more indirect if 
the moneylender decides to ration credit due his 
lack of legal recourse and the risk of default. In 
the first case, the borrower’s physical integrity is 
endangered, in the second he is barred from 
access to credit. 
Our study gave rise to two questions involving the 
context of legal enforceability: First, what is the 
legal situation of moneylenders in Sri Lanka? 
Second, how does the legal situation affect the 
moneylending business? 
                                                 
120 The exchange of funds among moneylenders also 
demonstrates that funds are not the only constraint – 
contacts to good clients are a second constraint (if not, 
there would be no reason to co-operate for the lending 
moneylender who has the funds). 
121 See Christen (1989), p. 25. 
The relevant source for the first question is the 
Money Lending Ordinance of 1918. The 
Ordinance is a six-page document stating that 
moneylending is in principle a legal activity and 
defining the legal conditions for it. Apart from 
more vaguely defined issues such as a ban on 
lending based on “undue influence,”  “harassing 
or intimidating” borrowers and requiring “a 
regular account of each loan,”122 the Ordinance 
sets out exact limits for interest rates. The interest 
rate for a loan of more than LKR 2,500 may not 
exceed 15 % p.a., and the total amount paid in 
interest may not be more than the principal. 123 
A rate of 15 % p.a. is lower than the interest rate 
moneylenders actually charge. However, the 
Ordinance allows a higher rate only in cases in 
which “the creditor ... shall satisfy the court that 
... the rate charged was in fact reasonable.”124 
Thus, as a rule, moneylending is legally not 
possible as a professional business and is permit-
ted only as an exception under vaguely defined 
conditions. 
On the other hand, we learned from our counter-
part, the People’s Bank, that promissory notes – 
documents often used by moneylenders to secure 
credits and prove the validity of a claim – are 
legally enforceable in Sri Lanka. Promissory notes 
are also mentioned in the Money Lending 
Ordinance as a legal instrument. However, the 
note must set out the interest rate charged.125 
Consequently, a moneylender would still have to 
prove that an interest rate higher than 15 % p.a. 
was appropriate. 
In Sri Lanka the majority of moneylenders neither 
use the legal system to enforce repayment nor 
need to fear any legal persecution, except by the 
tax authority. Although some moneylenders state 
that they could go to court to enforce repayment 
                                                 
122 Money Lending Ordinance (1918), p. 140, p. 143 and 
p. 142. 
123 See Money Lending Ordinance (1918), pp. 140-141. 
124 Money Lending Ordinance (1918), p. 141. 
125 See Money Lending Ordinance (1918), pp. 143-144. 
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of credits, most of them prefer not to do so. First, 
moneylenders fear losing the trust of other 
borrowers. Second, the legal system in Sri Lanka 
is seen as very slow. 
To come to the second question, i.e. whether legal 
enforceability lacking or at least not operable - 
how do moneylenders deal with enforcement? In 
our interviews at least some moneylenders 
admitted that they threaten their borrowers, or as 
one moneylender said to us: “I talk to them 
properly.” Moreover, at least two of the SSEs 
interviewed showed outright fear of their 
moneylender. The following statement of another 
moneylender seems to confirm that borrowers 
commonly expect that a moneylender may use 
violence or threats: “People come to me because I 
am not an aggressive person.” Altogether it is 
reasonable to assume that the problem is more 
widespread than we have been able to establish. 
Clearly, due to the nature of the topic not all 
moneylenders were willing to talk about it. 
The problem of legal enforceability is a twofold 
one: it is not only a threat to borrowers but also a 
risk for moneylenders. Although most money-
lenders have very low default rates, many 
perceive default as one of their main problems. 
An extreme example is a moneylender who stated 
that the business was very risky for him, although 
he never had a single defaulter in 20 years of 
moneylending. This may be explained by the fact 
that the probability of default is low, though due 
to the lack of legal enforceability losses in cases 
of default are high. 
To sum up, both problems – threats and credit 
rationing – are part of the moneylending business 
in Sri Lanka. However, our empirical finding 
indicate two other ways in which moneylenders 
deal with the lack of legal enforceability. 
One way to deal with defaulters is to co-operate 
with other moneylenders and exchange informa-
tion on the “trustworthiness of borrowers.” One 
moneylender explains: “We [moneylenders] meet 
in our Seetu [ROSCA] and exchange information 
about good and bad clients.” Others, however, 
emphasise that the exchange of information 
mainly concerns “bad clients” or “defaulters.” 
Exchanging information on bad clients has two 
functions: First, it serves as a warning against 
lending to a defaulter. Second, it serves as a 
sanction mechanism and an incentive for 
borrowers to repay. Most moneylenders state that 
if a borrower defaults, they will never lend to him 
again. However, this becomes an even stronger 
incentive when the consequence of default  is not 
only the impossibility of obtaining credit from his 
moneylender again, but a defaulter will be unable 
to obtain credit from any other moneylender. 
This approach to dealing with defaulters may be 
preferable to violent acts. But it is not in line with 
the general principles of the insolvency process, 
because the defaulter is personally marked and 
will never have a chance for a fresh start with a 
new business. 
The other approach, as we learned from one 
moneylender, is to go to the Mediation Board 
with a defaulting client. The Mediation Board is a 
local institution organised by the central 
government. Such boards exist in all 250 elector-
ates of Sri Lanka. “Minor” disputes have to be 
brought to the Mediation Board before they can be 
addressed in court. Major crimes are not consid-
ered. Mediation is free of charge, apart from a fee 
of LKR 5. Only if both parties agree to mediation 
can a settlement be reached. If the two parties fail 
to agree, the Mediation Board issues a statement, 
and the parties can go to court.126 
The Board consists of 15-25 members of different 
religions who may not be members of any 
polit ical party. Selection of members is based on a 
central government decision. Accordingly, the 
Board is attached not to local government but to 
the national government, with the local or regional 
government proposing the candidates. After 
selection, the members participate in a one-week 
workshop on mediation. Once constituted, the 
Mediation Board meets every week. In the case of 
                                                 
126 See Mediation Boards Act, No. 72 of 1988. Published as 
a Supplement to Part II of the Gazette of the Democratic 
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka of December 23, 1988. 
Informal Financing in Sri Lanka  39 
a loan dispute between a moneylender and a 
client, the moneylender can expect to secure 
repayment of at least a part of his loan. The client, 
on the other hand, will as a rule not have to repay 
the whole amount. Moreover, moneylenders do 
not have to fear any legal persecution in this  
connection. 
A member of the Mediation Board in Maskeliya 
informed us that there is an agreement that the 
interest rate must not exceed 100 % p.a. if it is to 
be eligible to a settlement before the Mediation 
Board. This would be (for loans of less than 1 
year) in accordance with the stipulation in the 
Money Lending Ordinance that interest payments 
may not exceed the principal of the loan. In the 
case of the moneylender we interviewed, the 
borrower had to repay the principal, but his 
interest payment was cancelled. Thus the money-
lender was unable to avoid a loss, but his potential 
loss was reduced substantially. A typical outcome 
could also be, according to the Mediation Board 
in Kandy, that the borrower is required to pay 
only 50 % of the interest previously stipulated. 
4.2 The Credit Supply Provided by 
Rotating Savings and Credit 
Associations (ROSCAs) to SSEs 
Next to moneylenders, ROSCAs, which are called 
Seetus in Sri Lanka, are the most common 
providers of financial services in the informal 
financial sector in Sri Lanka.127 ROSCAs are 
institutions with a long tradition. They exist in 
many developing countries, in rural and urban 
regions alike.128 ROSCAs can be seen as a 
promising opportunity for those who have no 
access or only restricted access to the formal 
financial system.129 They are very appropriate 
creators of credit and savings because they work 
                                                 
127 See Padmanabhan (1996), p. 45 and Matin, et al. (1999), 
pp. 13-14. 
128 Asian Development Bank (1990), p. 198. 
129 See Kimuyu (1999), p. 1299; Tchuindjo (1999), p. 15. 
on a sustainable basis.130 ROSCAs can provide 
SSEs with a variety of financial services. 
ROSCAs are an important source of credit and 
savings for SSEs, and most ROSCA organisers 
and members we interviewed are small entrepre-
neurs. 
The first part of this section defines what a 
ROSCA is and defines the framework for our 
analysis. Furthermore, it outlines the different 
characteristics of ROSCAs (4.2.1). The second 
section (4.2.2) will illustrate the role of ROSCAs 
as a source of credit and savings for SSEs. The 
last section will analyse the strengths and weak-
nesses of ROSCAs (4.2.3 and 4.2.4). 
4.2.1 Characteristics of ROSCAs  
Ardener defines a ROSCA as “an association 
formed upon a core of participants to make 
regular contributions to a fund which is given, in 
whole or in part, to each contributor in rota-
tion.”131 The definit ion contains the two crucial 
principles that distinguish ROSCAs from other 
savings associations: rotation and regularity.132 
In Sri Lanka, ROSCAs normally reorganise after 
one cycle. We interviewed ROSCAs that have 
already existed for 20 years, and most of them 
exist for four to five years. They always repeat the 
cycle once it has been completed. 
ROSCAs are highly heterogeneous. It is important 
to mention some features in order to define them 
precisely: Some ROSCAs have different kinds of 
official positions, such as the organiser, the 
secretary and the treasurer.133 Some ROSCAs do 
not have an organiser at all, whereas others have 
more than one.134 The organiser’s task is to collect 
                                                 
130 See Von Pischke (1992), p. 326. 
131 Ardener (1964), p. 201. 
132 See Ardener (1964), p. 201. 
133 See Ardener (1964), p. 211. 
134 See Ardener (1964), p. 211. 
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member deposits and to give the entire fund to the 
member whose turn it is to receive it.135 
The ROSCAs we interviewed in Sri Lanka all 
have one organiser who at the same time is the 
treasurer of the association. He always receives 
the first fund (in ROSCAs that draw lots) or the 
second fund (in ROSCAs that auction the fund).136 
This is a kind of remuneration for the duty he 
performs. If a member defaults, the organiser is 
responsible for compensating the other members 
for their losses; he pays the contributions of the 
defaulter, in this way guaranteeing a regular func-
tioning of the ROSCA.137 
The mode of operation of ROSCAs is determined 
by the different methods used to decide the order 
of rotation. According to Ardener, there are five 
important methods used to determine the order of 
rotation: The order may either be determined by 
consent of all members or fixed by the organiser. 
                                                 
135 See Krahnen /Schmidt (1994), p. 46; Adams / Canavesi 
(1989), p. 228 and p. 232. 
136 The different methods used to determine the order of 
rotation are described in the following paragraph. 
137 For similar findings, see Fernando (1986), p. 26. 
In both cases, members who urgently need money 
often obtain the fund at the beginning of the 
round. Another possibility is to proceed on the 
basis of predetermined factors such as age or 
kinship. Some of the more technical methods 
include the system of drawing lots138 and the 
auction mechanism. 139 These are reported to be 
very important modes of operation.140 
Our empirical findings from Sri Lanka indicate 
that ROSCAs operate on the basis of two different 
systems: a system based on lots and an auction 
mechanism. In the former, numbered lots are put 
in a bowl and every member draws one. The 
numbers correspond to the number of members, 
except the organiser, who is given the first fund. 
The number drawn indicates the round in which a 
member will receive the fund. Members receive 
the same amount from the fund that they 
contribute to it. Only in a very few ROSCAs do 
members have to pay a commission to the 
organiser when they receive a fund; this may 
range between 0.5 and 1.3 % of the fund’s total 
amount. 
The auction mechanism in Sri Lankan ROSCAs 
works as described above. In auction ROSCAs, 
the organiser always receives the second fund 
without having to bid. 141 The auction mechanism 
is more complicated than drawing lots. The 
condition on which it rests is that at least some 
members will be willing and able to bid a high 
sum to get the fund. If they are not willing or able 
to bid, they have to wait until the end of the 
procedure. 
 
                                                 
138 To compensate the member who drew the last lot, the 
ROSCA may put him at the beginning of the next cycle. 
This member now has the option to pool both funds and 
make larger investments. See Bouman (1995), p. 379. 
139 See Ardener (1964), pp. 210-211. 
140 See Kovsted / Lyk-Jensen (1999), p. 145. 
141 The same or similar findings have been made by 
Sanderatne and Senanayake and Fernando. See 
Sanderatne / Senanayake (1989), p. 141; Fernando 
(1986), pp. 25-26. 
Box 6: Typical Operation of a ROSCA 
A ROSCA with ten members that meets once a month may 
serve as an example: since there are ten members, the cycle 
takes ten months. During a defined cycle, the first member 
receiving the fund is a debtor to the other members until he 
has made his last contribution. The last member to receive 
the fund is a creditor to the other members. The duration of 
the cycle depends on the number of members and the 
frequency of meetings. Once each member has received the 
fund, the cycle is completed and the ROSCA disbands or 
reorganises.a To obtain another fund, members have to wait 
until the next cycle begins, provided that the ROSCA 
reorganises. Loans are a one-off event. 
Source: See Ardener (1964), p. 201; Bouman (1995), 
p. 374. 
a Round is used to refer to each contribution, 
whereas the term cycle is used for the complete 
set of rounds 
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Although this might lead to the assumption that 
auction ROSCAs, being more flexible, would be 
more frequented by SSEs, we found that both 
auction and lot ROSCAs are equally relevant for 
SSEs, particularly with regard to their size, monthly 
contributions and fund volumes (see Table 8). 
According to the literature, the organisation of 
ROSCAs differs considerably in terms of size and 
frequency and meeting place. The size of an asso-
ciation may vary between five and several hun-
dred members, the average size being between ten 
and fifty.142 Some ROSCAs meet weekly or every 
two weeks; others meet only every few months. 
The average frequency of meetings is one per 
month. The money involved may be collected at a 
special meeting house or a member’s house, or the  
                                                 
142 See Schrieder / Cuevas (1992), p. 49. 
members may meet at the organiser’s house, in 
the marketplace or a beer-hall.143 
 
In Sri Lanka, almost all ROSCAs that we inter-
viewed meet monthly. One experienced organiser 
of lot ROSCAs declared that they only meet once,  
the first time, when the lots are drawn. After that, 
the members bring their contributions to the 
organiser or he collects them and hands over the 
fund to the due recipient. However, the entire 
group no longer meets. The average size of the 
ROSCAs interviewed is 15.5 members, and the 
average duration of a ROSCA is 13 months. The 
reason why these figures do not correspond is that 
some ROSCAs meet not monthly but weekly or 
every ten days. In other ROSCAs it is possible for  
                                                 
143 See Ardener (1964), p. 211. 
Table 8: Difference between ROSCAs as Regards the Order of Rotation in Sri Lanka 
Indicators 
Auction ROSCAs  
(13) 
Lot ROSCAs 
(7) 
Average size (members) 15.6 15.4 
Average duration (months) 13.5 12.8 
Average monthly contribution (in LKR) 12,190 13,000 
Average monthly fund volume (in LKR) 193,000 190,000 
Source: Authors’ survey 
Box 7: Operation of an Auction ROSCA 
Auction ROSCAs work on the basis of an open auction. Only members who have not already received the fund are allowed to bid. 
An example will used to illustrate the mechanism: the fund may contain a hundred units (ten members paying ten units). A 
member may opt to take ninety-five instead of a hundred units. Another member may be willing to accept an even lower sum, e.g. 
ninety units. The member offering the lowest sum is given the fund. The difference between the nominal fund and the effective 
fund can be seen as an interest rate on the fund (in this case, the interest rate would be 10 %). This sum (interest rate) is divided up 
among the members as compensation for their regular contributions. The ten units (100 – 90) are broken down by individual 
contributions (10 units), so that every member has to pay in only nine units in the next round. Since this is repeated in all the 
following rounds, the effective interest paid is not as high as it may seem and may be considered moderate. Individuals who bid 
relatively small sums in the early rounds of the ROSCA cycle pay relatively high rates of interest on their loans, while individuals 
who consistently offer high sums and receive their fund towards the end of the cycle realise relatively high interest rates on their 
deposits. This system makes it possible to compensate for the advantages or disadvantages involved in any particular position in 
the order of rotation. 
Source:        Authors’ compilation 
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members to contribute for two members and 
receive double the amount of the fund. This 
accelerates the cycle. ROSCAs in Sri Lanka 
normally meet at the organiser’s house or shop. 
Membership can be determined by geographical 
proximity. This is especially true for rural areas. 
Other important criteria for membership are 
profession, sex, age, kinship and religion. Social 
or ethnic criteria may play an important role as 
well. 144 
Our empirical findings from Sri Lanka indicate 
that trust is a very important element in most 
ROSCAs, though not in all of them. Organisers 
choose their members because they trust them as 
persons whom they know and in whose financial 
capacities they trust. Many organisers stated that 
they had already known the other members for a 
number of years. 
In some ROSCAs, the element of trust is not very 
important. They come together because the 
members’ financial resources are similar in nature 
and members have, roughly speaking, the same 
professions and similar social backgrounds. In this 
case, the organisers base new memberships 
mainly on inquiries conducted into potential par-
tic ipants. It is important for the organisers to be 
sure that members are able to pay their regular 
contributions. Members are therefore normally 
expected to have a prospering business, which 
guarantees their savings capacity, credit-
worthiness and reputation.145 
Contributions may be made in cash or in kind; 
combinations of both are possible as well. To 
accelerate the cycle, two members can pay double 
contributions and receive their funds at the same 
time; or members may pay more than one contri-
bution into the fund and accordingly receive more 
than one loan. Since ROSCA members make 
equal or similar contributions, their income situa-
                                                 
144 See Ardener (1964), p. 210; Germidis / Kessler / Meghir 
(1991), p. 152. 
145 Fernando comes to the same result. See Fernando 
(1986), p. 26. 
tion has to be similar. A group is therefore usually 
quite homogeneous in terms of member 
incomes.146 
In Sri Lanka we encountered only ROSCAs in 
which members are allowed to contribute in cash. 
We did not interview any ROSCAs whose 
members are allowed to pay in kind. In some 
ROSCAs, members can pay with on-dated or 
post-dated cheques. On the one hand, this can be 
seen as a special service of the organiser aimed at 
making it easier for members to make regular 
contributions when they are short of cash. On the 
other hand, this is a kind of insurance for the 
organiser, because when members lack the neces-
sary cash, he at least has a cheque to ensure 
payment. 
It is important to mention that in general contri-
butions are made when the ROSCA meets, which 
is monthly in most cases. However, there are 
some members who are required to pay their 
contributions daily. These appear to be less trust-
worthy members, and the organisers use this kind 
of “control” to ensure regular payment. 
4.2.2 ROSCAs as a Source of Credit and 
Savings for SSEs 
ROSCAs offer financial and social services to 
their members on a rotating basis. Their financial 
services are explicitly characterised by the term 
Rotating Saving and Credit Association: they 
facilitate savings and provide credits for their 
participants.147 Thus ROSCAs assume a financial 
intermediation function between savers and 
borrowers. “It is traditional, as the name indi-
cates, to analyse the ROSCAs in terms of financial 
intermediation: Members of the group receiving 
the kitty are seen as the ‘borrowers’ ... The 
members who have not collected the kitty yet are 
net savers who accumulate claims on those 
members who have already collected the kitty and 
                                                 
146 See Bouman (1995), p. 374. 
147 See Sika / Strasser (2000), pp. 316-317. 
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are the net borrowers.”148 Because of the rotation 
of the fund, its capital is always in the hands of 
one member and therefore used. 
We can thus distinguish between two kinds of 
financial services of a ROSCA: The first is to 
provides possibilities to save money. The 
reciprocal agreement between the members even 
forces them to save regularly. Also, participating 
in a ROSCA keeps member resources from being 
absorbed by their families. In this way members 
are able to control their cash flows throughout the 
year.149 
The second function of a ROSCA is transforma-
tion of the volume of savings: having saved a 
fixed sum regularly for a certain period of time, a 
bigger sum of money is available to the saver in a 
period of time shorter than if he were saving 
individua lly. Members who receive the first fund 
may even be able to obtain a lump sum of money 
without having saved beforehand. This may be 
regarded as credit, and members repay their 
“debts” by paying their contributions regularly. 150 
Furthermore, ROSCAs are perceived as less 
intimidating than banks or other financial institu-
tions, and the credit they provide is not bound to 
any specific ends. Members can use their fund for 
whatever purpose they want, without being 
obliged to document its use.151 ROSCAs represent 
an important source of finance for SSEs, because 
in such cases enterprise and family are often 
inseparable and SSEs often need credits that are 
not directed to a specific use. 
There are business-oriented ROSCAs as well as 
consumption-oriented ROSCAs . Business-
oriented ROSCAs usually operate with a long-
term perspective. Thanks to their profitability, 
members often join together again at the end of 
each cycle. Consumption-oriented ROSCAs have 
                                                 
148 Callier (1990), p. 274. 
149 See Sika / Strasser (2000), p. 317. 
150 See Krahnen / Schmidt (1992), pp. 47-48. 
151 See Tchuindjo (1999), p. 15. 
a shorter duration and regularly disband at the end 
of the cycle.152 This difference results in different 
uses of the fund. These may range from 
consumption- or production-related uses to 
investment-related purposes. In urban areas, 
ROSCA members often use their funds for 
investment purposes. They may invest in their 
own businesses or in an expansion of their busi-
ness activities. In rural areas, where many 
ROSCA members are farmers, the ROSCA fund 
is mainly used for production purposes. Members 
may invest in fertilisers, seeds or other equipment, 
in labour or in means of transport.153 
The social function of ROSCAs is a more 
implicit one. Since ROSCA members set their 
own rules, the mechanisms are easy for them to 
understand and do not constitute an obstacle to 
partic ipation. Furthermore, the rules are consistent 
with the accepted norms of the society in which 
ROSCAs are set.154 The commitment of their 
members makes it possible for ROSCAs to offer a 
kind of social security, which in most developing 
countries is not provided by the state or other 
formal actors. “It is the commitment to participate 
in these rotating credit societies which gives the 
psychological impetus for contributing the agreed 
amounts.”155 In addition, members use the 
meetings to exchange information and news and 
to help one other.156 
Our interviews have shown that most members 
and all organisers of the ROSCAs we looked into 
are businessmen who belong to the group of 
SSEs. In most ROSCAs all members, including 
the organiser, are small entrepreneurs. Four of our 
ROSCAs are mixed groups in which some of the 
members are SSEs and the others are civil 
servants or employees. In Maskeliya and Kandy 
we did not interview any mixed ROSCAs. These 
                                                 
152 See ADB (1990), p. 203. 
153 See Bouman (1995), p. 373; Germidis / Kessler / Meghir 
(1991), p. 161. 
154 See Tchuindjo (1999), p. 14. 
155 Sanderatne / Senanayake (1989), p. 141. 
156 See Bouman (1997), pp. 188-189. 
 Kathrin Berensmann et al. 44
were frequented exclusively by small entrepre-
neurs. 
People participate in a ROSCA in order to obtain 
a lump sum of money without any particular 
complications. It can be inferred from out inter-
views that the motivation to participate is a kind 
of liquidity management. Members need 
certainty about their cash flows. As members of a 
ROSCA, they always know when they have to 
contribute. They either know when they are to 
receive a lump sum (lot ROSCAs), or they decide 
to distribute it by auction (auction ROSCAs). This 
makes it possible for members to plan in advance 
when to use the money and what to use it for. We 
can break them down into two groups: some of 
them are motivated by the credit aspect, for others 
disciplined saving is the incentive for participa-
tion. 
The purpose of receiving a lump sum of money 
may be regarded as equivalent to obtaining a 
credit. This was noted by about half of the 
persons interviewed (organisers as well as 
members): they participate in a ROSCA to gain 
easy, cheap and fast access to credit. For some of 
them it is easier to get credit from a ROSCA than 
from a bank, because in the former case they do 
not need any collateral or guarantor. This is 
important because small entrepreneurs often 
cannot provide the collateral required by a 
bank.157 Members who participate in lot ROSCAs 
mentioned that for them it is important not to have 
to pay any interest. One organiser noted that the 
ROSCA was a substitute for a bank loan. As soon 
as a bank were prepared to give him a loan, he 
noted, he would do without the ROSCA.158  
About half of the interview partners who stated 
that credit is the most important motive for par-
ticipation specified their motivation, noting that 
they needed a source of finance for their bus i-
nesses. Some of them needed capital to start a 
                                                 
157 Banks often require land deeds or titles, which they do 
not possess. 
158 He assumed that he is refused a bank loan because he is 
too young. He was 22 years old. 
business, others needed a regular source of credit 
for working capital. For other entrepreneurs, the 
motive for participation was not businesses 
financing but consumption, investment in assets 
such as vehicles or immovable goods or provision 
for emergency cases such as funerals or illness of 
family members. The need to finance weddings 
was also mentioned. 
Some of the organisers interviewed declared that 
their main motivation was to obtain additional 
income, or to have an income in the first place. 
Getting regularly the ROSCA fund allows them to 
have extra expenses. One of our interviewees uses 
the ROSCA to attain a certain lifestyle. Once he 
has reached it, he plans to drop his ROSCA 
activity. 
Receipt of a lump sum of money is also linked to 
a certain measure of discipline in savings. Some 
organisers stated that discipline in saving  was 
one of the motives inducing them to start out 
organising the ROSCA. They also stated that for 
their members savings are an incentive to partic i-
pate in the ROSCA. This is because members 
have to contribute regularly, and often the date, 
and sometimes even the hour, for contributions 
are fixed. 
In addition, we were informed that there is certain 
connection between ROSCAs and moneylenders. 
We found that there are some ROSCA organisers 
and ROSCA members who are also active in the 
field of moneylending. These persons use the 
ROSCA fund for lending purposes. The ROSCA 
fund provides them the possibility to enlarge their 
liquidity and thus to engage in moneylending. 
Many organisers state that they lend interest-free 
to members when they are in financial need. The 
daily contributions of some members make it 
possible for these persons to lend out paid-in 
contributions for a very short period of time. This 
credit has to be paid back by the next disburse-
ment of the fund. The maximum lending period is 
thus normally one month. 
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4.2.3 Strengths of ROSCAs 
The major strengths of ROSCAs are low default 
rates, high flexibility concerning their adaptation 
to member needs, low interest rates and low trans-
action costs. 
4.2.3.1 Low Default Rates 
Since their members are selected on the basis of 
confidence, proximity and honour, ROSCAs are 
self-stabilising. The reciprocity between the 
members results in a kind of mutual control, so-
called “peer-monitoring.” This mutual control 
implies that no supervision of the members’ use of 
the fund is needed. Lenders are interested in the 
regular contributions of net borrowers, which 
ensure that the net lender will get the fund later. 
This is closely related to the high rates of return. 
Since each member depends on the solidarity and 
aid of the others, members contribute correctly 
and repay credits on time. ROSCAs operate 
entirely on promise, trust and consent.159 
Furthermore, ROSCA members often fear social 
exclusion if they default because of the pressure 
of public opinion within the membership. Since 
sanctions are more social, the repayment rate is 
very good – members do not want to lose their 
reputation. 160 This is also why ROSCAs do not 
require any guarantees or collateral. This makes 
them attractive for SSEs. 
ROSCAs in Sri Lanka have a low default rate. 
Some organisers stated explicitly that they had 
had default cases. Some said that they had never 
experienced a default, and six declared that 
default and delay occur very rarely. The main 
reason is that ROSCAs are mainly based on 
mutual trust and personal knowledge. 
Most of ROSCA organisers emphasise that trust 
is a very important element in their ROSCAs. 
                                                 
159 See Krahnen / Schmidt (1994), pp. 49-50; Sika / Strasser 
(2000), p. 317. 
160 See Ardener (1964), p. 216. 
They have often known their members for some 
years. Our interviews show that organisers do not 
require collateral from members with whom they 
have trustful relationships. Most organisers stated 
that they do not require any collateral from their 
members. The only condition for entry is personal 
knowledge and mutual trust.161 
Another consequence of a trust-based relationship 
is that the majority of members pay their contri-
butions. The default rate is therefore very low. 
First, we found that default does occur in some of 
the ROSCAs we interviewed. However, the 
organisers who noted that default occurs in their 
ROSCA have on average had experience with one 
or two default cases. Some organisers have had no 
experience at all with defaulters. Although they 
always compensate defaulters with their own 
money, default is perceived as a very rare phe-
nomenon and not seen as a problem for the 
organisers. Only one organiser told us that it is a 
major problem for him when someone defaults. In 
this case he has to approach a moneylender or a 
pawnbroker to make up for the defaulter’s contri-
bution. Fortunately, in his ROSCA this has 
occurred only very rarely. 
A phenomenon that occurs more frequently is 
delayed payment. To ensure that the ROSCA 
functions properly, organisers make up for contri-
butions of members who pay late, later demanding 
repayment from the member concerned. In these 
cases, the organisers also stated that they do not 
regard delay as a problem because they are sure to 
receive their money back. Since neither members 
nor organisers see the ROSCA exclusively as a 
“credit institute,” the relationship between them is 
both financial and social. They are therefore 
interested in a smooth functioning of the ROSCA, 
and they normally pay their contributions 
regularly. 
In other ROSCAs where there is no personal 
relationship between organiser and members, 
organisers restrict membership to criteria other 
than trust. This means, for instance, that the 
                                                 
161 This was stated both by the organisers and the members. 
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organiser may inquire for information on 
members’ financ ial situations. One condition for 
membership is that their businesses are operating 
well. One organiser even requires family members 
to be employed in the business of the ROSCA 
member, in this way gaining additional assurance 
that contributions will be paid. Another organiser 
requires a guarantor for members whom he does 
not know very well. The same organiser also 
requires a cheque from members who have 
received their fund before having contributed the 
entire amount.162 The only female organiser we 
interviewed stated that she requires a letter from 
her members, in which they confirm the regular 
contributions at a fixed date. If they do not pay, 
she would go to the police. In these ROSCAs, we 
cannot speak of a personal relation between the 
organiser and the members because the relation is 
restricted to the knowledge of the members’ well 
running bus iness. Nevertheless, it is a successful 
instrument to minimise the risk of default. 
One point to mention is that in certain ROSCAs 
some members pay the monthly contribution in a 
lump sum and the others pay daily instalments of 
the contribution. An example would be a monthly 
contribution of LKR 12,000 per member that has 
to be paid on the 20th of every month, before the 
whole fund is disbursed to the receiver on the 30th. 
Some pay a lump sum of LKR 12,000 at the 20th, 
others pay every day LKR 400. In 30 days they 
contribute LKR 12,000 as well. It seems that in 
most cases the monthly contributions are a kind of 
privilege for the members because the organiser 
trusts them that they will contribute in time. 
Members, who does not seem to be trustworthy, 
have to pay their contributions daily. 
It has been shown that the default rate is low. 
However, in cases, default or delayed payment 
happen, all organisers confirmed that they 
compensate default with their own money, so that 
                                                 
162 This particular ROSCA organiser emphasised his trust in 
his members, but it appeared that trust is in fact 
restricted to knowledge on of the members’ businesses. 
We had the impression that there is no trust at all, 
because the collateral he requires and the restrictions he 
imposes are comparatively high. 
every member gets the fund in time and does not 
have any negative consequences. This responsi-
bility of the organiser is part of the indirect 
agreement between the organisers and the 
members. Knowing this, the members can trust 
the organiser because they know that they will not 
lose their contributions. Furthermore, all 
organisers stated that they exclude defaulters from 
the next ROSCA cycle. 
4.2.3.2 Flexibility 
As a result of the solidarity and the autonomy, 
ROSCAs are quite flexible and are able  to adapt 
to the individual needs of members. Giving the 
collected contribution to the member who is most 
in need, the fund may serve as an assistance fund. 
It is also possible to transfer it to another person. 
If a ROSCA member is in urgent need and 
borrows money from someone else, he can 
transfer his rights to obtain the fund to this person, 
who does not necessarily have to be a member of 
the ROSCA. Paying his contributions regularly, 
he gradually pays back his debt.163 Two members 
can split their fund, so that both have a certain 
sum at the early stage of the round and one share 
later, provided that both have the necessity to 
obtain a credit and to accumulate savings.164 In the 
context of high social and economic insecurity, 
this flexibility is one of the determinants of 
success.165 
Our interviews have shown that ROSCA 
organisers handle the ROSCAs very flexible in 
order to make the participation attractive for the 
members. Thus, we can confirm our hypothesis 
that ROSCAs are flexible because often the 
members’ personal needs are taken into account 
from the organisers. The following analysis is 
based on the information we got from auction as 
well as from lot ROSCAs. 
                                                 
163 See Ardener (1964), p. 215. 
164 See Bouman (1995), p. 378. 
165 See Tchuindjo (1999), p. 13. 
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The paying modalities are handled flexible in 
most ROSCAs we interviewed. In nearly all 
ROSCAs, members have to hand in their contri-
butions to the organiser. However, some 
organisers collect the contributions from their 
members. On the one hand, it means a reduction 
of transaction costs for the members, when the 
organiser collects the contributions from them. On 
the other hand, it has the connotation that the 
organiser does not trust his members and prefers 
collecting the contributions than receiving them 
late or never. 
Some organisers allow their members to pay with 
on-dated or post-dated cheques, if they do not 
have cash at the contribution time. This is a big 
advantage for the members because some 
members affirmed that fixed contribution dates 
are difficult to realise. 
In some ROSCAs it is possible for a member to 
pay the double contribution and then get the 
double fund. The member can choose whether to 
take the double amount of the fund at the same 
time or to take two disbursements of the fund. 
We have seen above that all organisers pay the 
contributions of delayers or defaulters, which is 
one instrument to guarantee a trouble -free 
functioning of the ROSCA. Furthermore, this 
allows members to handle their contributions in a 
more flexible manner. Although this is a very 
attractive service, it has to be considered that the 
organiser will accept delay only in emergency 
cases. Members who often pay too late are likely 
to be excluded from the ROSCA in the long run. 
In general, lot ROSCAs are more inflexible than 
auction ROSCAs. This is due to the fact that the 
order of rotation is predetermined by lot. This 
inflexibility can lead to the problem that the point 
of time at which a member receives the fund may 
not correspond to his financial requirements. In 
general, this is true for the lot ROSCAs in Sri 
Lanka as well. However, there is also a certain 
flexibility among members. In all of the lot 
ROSCAs we interviewed, it is possible to 
exchange lots. In the event that a member needs 
money urgently, he can exchange his lot with 
someone who has drawn an earlier one. If two 
members need the fund at the same time, they 
sometimes share it. In other words, these two 
members are given the fund in two instalments. 
Often there is a mutual agreement among 
members to help one another. 
4.2.3.3 Low Interest Rates 
One reason why ROSCAs are in general very 
attractive for their members is that ROSCAs – 
compared with other informal sources of finance – 
offer quite low interest. ROSCAs that determine 
the order of rotation by lot or by consent normally 
charge no interest. 
Auction ROSCAs charge interest. Although their 
interest rates may appear high, not all members 
have to pay them. Members have to choose 
between the returns on a given investment which 
they could realise with an early fund and the 
interest that they would receive for a later fund. 
Furthermore, it should be considered that clients 
in the informal financial sector, and particularly 
SSEs, often need prompt disbursement of short-
term credits. People with regular income or with 
small enterprises normally have enough money to 
participate in an auction ROSCA and can choose 
the ROSCA with the highest frequency of 
meetings and the highest contributions, provided 
that no other barriers such as ethnic, religious or 
other aspects prevent their participation in the one 
they have chosen. They prefer auction ROSCAs 
because the latter can either mobilise investment 
capital or offer a high return on their savings. In 
the context of a liquidity shortage it may make 
sense to take an “expensive” credit to make 
immediate investments aimed at covering short-
time costs.166 
The empirical information obtained from our 
interviews largely confirms the hypothesis that 
interest rates are low. In the lot ROSCAs we 
interviewed, members do not have to pay any 
                                                 
166 The average interest rate is calculated to be between 5 
and 10 % p.m. See Rutherford (1999), pp. 27-28. 
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interest. They always receive the same amount 
they contribute. As mentioned above, only in 
some cases do they have to pay a commission to 
the organiser, which is, first, very low, between 
0.5 and 1.3 %, and, second, is not considered real 
interest but is seen as compensation for the 
organiser’s work. On the one hand, members have 
to take into account their losses in foregone 
interest; after all, they could have saved with a 
bank or joined an auction ROSCA. On the other 
hand, there are ROSCA members who do not 
have a savings account at a bank. Members are 
willing to let fortune decide when the lump sum is 
theirs because they in this way gain access to very 
cheap and easy credit, without collateral and 
guarantor. Furthermore, they are forced to save a 
fixed amount of money, which is a major 
incentive to partic ipate in a ROSCA. 
In auction ROSCAs, members have to pay a 
certain sum to obtain the fund; this is equivalent 
to interest. Normally, organisers fix a minimum 
rate that has to be paid to obtain the first fund. In 
most cases the rate is higher at the beginning of 
the cycle than at the end. 167 One organiser sets a 
minimum bid for every round. Sometimes there 
are no bids because no member needs the money 
at that moment. In this case the organiser opts for 
the lot system, and the member who draws the lot 
has to take the fund for the amount fixed. 
At the beginning of a cycle, bids for the fund are 
normally very high. The average first bid is 20-
25 % of the amount of the fund. One organiser 
told us that winning bid for one first fund was 
even 49 %.168 Towards the end, the amounts of 
bids decrease because there are fewer people 
competing for the fund. The average amount is 
about 4 % for the last funds bid on. One example 
would be a ROSCA with a fund of LKR 120,000. 
LKR 42,400 was bid for the first fund, and bid for 
the tenth fund was LKR 3,000. There were no 
                                                 
167 In some ROSCAs, the rate is constant throughout the 
overall cycle. 
168 It has to be mentioned that interest is fictional because 
every member is given back a certain amount of money. 
bids for the last two funds, and so the recipients of 
the last two funds were given the entire fund. 
It is important to mention that the interest 
members pay to obtain the fund is only “fictional” 
interest because the amount bid (“fictional” 
interest) is distributed among members, so that in 
every round all member receive a certain amount 
of their money back. The effective interest is very 
difficult to calculate; no ROSCA provided us with 
information about amounts bid in each round. 
The bidding system is one of the very big advan-
tages of auction ROSCAs. There are members 
who urgently need money and have the financial 
capacity to bid a high sum to obtain the credit as 
quickly as possible. Many members who are 
willing to bid a high sum use the fund to invest in 
their businesses. Others who have no urgent needs 
wait until the end of the cycle. They use the 
ROSCA more for savings purposes. 
4.2.3.4 Low Transaction Costs 
ROSCAs have low transaction costs.169 Ad-
ministrative costs are low as well. 170 Often, the 
only assets they have is a book and a pen to record 
all transactions. Since they often meet at the 
organiser’s house or in houses of members, they 
do not need to rent a room.171 Both deposits and 
borrowing entail transaction costs. Deposits may 
be difficult to make because of pressure within the 
family, e.g. if a family member needs medical 
help. Borrowing costs are quite high because it 
may be necessary to borrow from different 
persons or to obtain information about the best 
conditions available, etc. Since ROSCAs normally 
operate outside the legal system, members do not 
have to cope with the bureaucratic procedures 
required to apply for credit.172 
                                                 
169 In this context they include information, overhead and 
management costs. 
170 Bouman (1984), p. 241. 
171 See Fernando (1986), p. 27. 
172 See Burkett (1989), p. 403; Tchuindjo (1999), p. 15. 
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The hypothesis that ROSCAs have low transac-
tion costs was confirmed by our empirical survey. 
The accounting system, which is normally put 
down under transaction costs, cannot be 
considered a cost factor. Organisers who do keep 
accounts only wrote down the names of members, 
contributions and dates as well as the amounts bid 
in the case of auction ROSCAs. All of the 
ROSCAs we interviewed operate quite simply, 
and thus there are no complicated bureaucratic 
procedures involved. 
Organisers have more costs than members, but in 
most cases these are negligible. Normally, 
meetings are held in the organiser’s house, which 
means that the latter incur no renta l or transport 
costs. Although some organisers stated that they 
collect all contributions, most of them collect 
contributions only from some members. In 
general, they combine their collection tours with 
other transactions, and thus such transport costs 
are not only attributable to the ROSCA. Two 
organisers pay agents to collect contributions from 
the members, but these are very small sums.173 
Some organisers prepare a social event for 
members when they meet, which means a certain 
amount of expenses for them. Considerable 
transaction costs are involved when potential 
members are unknown to the organiser, because in 
this case organisers are forced to gather informa-
tion about new members. 
Compensation for delayed payments or default are 
the organisers’ only real costs. Although many 
organisers did not perceive default as a real 
problem, the organisers’ responsibility to provide 
compensation in cases of delay or default 
represents an important advantage as well as 
security for members. Members’ costs are far 
lower than those borne by organisers. Members 
have to travel to the organiser’s house for 
meetings. Usually they are required bring their 
contributions to the organiser. New membership 
entails some information costs. Members often 
                                                 
173 One stated that his agent earns LKR 200 per month. The 
other stated that a boy who is employed in his shop is 
used for the purpose. 
know the organiser well, or another member may 
introduce them to the ROSCA. 
In most lot ROSCAs, members are not required to 
pay any interest or commissions. Only in three 
ROSCAs do the organisers require a very small 
commission from the member who is given the 
fund. The amount varies between 0.5 % and 1.3 % 
of the amount of the fund. In one case the 
members were even able to decide whether to pay 
a commission to the organiser. 
4.2.4 Weaknesses of ROSCAs  
Apart from their strengths, ROSCAs are also 
subject to certain weaknesses. The most relevant 
weaknesses are that ROSCAs cannot provide 
long-term credits and that they are without any 
means of legal enforcement. 
4.2.4.1 No Long-term Credits 
The most important weakness of ROSCAs is that 
they do not offer any possibility to convert short-
term savings into long-term credits. The duration 
of a credit cannot exceed the duration of a cycle, 
which is 13 months on average. Therefore, on the 
one hand, there is no incentive to use ROSCA 
funds to finance longer-term projects. On the 
other hand, cycles can be renewed, and it would 
be possible to collect contributions for more than 
one cycle until a given sum is available. It might 
also be possible to transfer individual contribu-
tions to the next cycle. This would allow ROSCAs 
to grant medium- and long-term loans. The 
problem lies in the time gap between rounds, 
when the money is not saved but held by 
members. During this period it is nearly 
impossible not to spend the money until the next 
round begins.174 To solve this problem, some 
ROSCAs give the organiser the first fund, and he 
can lend it on to a member who is in financial 
                                                 
174 See Sika / Strasser (2000), p. 317; Tchuindjo (1999), 
p. 16. 
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need in between two cycles. However, some 
organisers demand quite high interest rates and in 
this way “become moneylenders in disguise.”175 
This hypothesis was confirmed in our empirical 
study in Sri Lanka. The period of a credit is 
restricted to the duration of a ROSCA cycle, 
which is on average 13 months. We were 
informed that all ROSCAs renew the cycle when 
it has been completed, and thus may exist for a 
number of years. However, all members and 
organisers interviewed stated that they use the 
fund immediately. They do not save the money 
from one cycle for the next cycle, as described 
above. Although this is regarded as a weakness of 
ROSCAs, it has to be taken into account that 
short-term credits are an important service that is 
not provided by lenders from the formal financial 
sector, though it is one needed by SSEs. 
4.2.4.2 No Legal Enforcement 
Peer monitoring appears to work very well in 
ROSCAs. Nevertheless, there is a certain risk that 
an organiser may exploit members, since he has 
the fund under his control and may abscond with 
the money. However, it is not only the organiser 
who poses a risk, members who receive the fund 
at an early stage may also disappear with their 
fund or not return to pay their regular contribu-
tions.176 
Since ROSCAs operate in the informal financial 
sector, members and organisers have very few 
means available to ensure regular payment, apart 
from trust-based relationships and member 
selection. To ensure regular contributions, 
ROSCAs may divide the fund into two parts, with 
a potential defaulter obtaining part of the fund at 
the beginning, but having to wait until the end 
before he receives the second part of his fund. He 
may also be put at the end of the rotation cycle, 
                                                 
175 Bouman (1995), p. 378. 
176 See GDRC. 
and thus be the last member to receive the fund.177 
Other ROSCAs require other forms of protection. 
Their members are required to provide some form 
of collateral or a guarantor who inspires 
confidence and assumes a payment obligation in 
the event of default. In some ROSCAs, even the 
guarantor has to deposit colla teral. However, these 
types of risk management appear to be used only 
very rarely.178 
Even though ROSCAs operate in the informal 
financial sector, it would be possible for 
organisers and members to sign a contract making 
it possible to apply legal sanctions in the event of 
default. In some countries, such contracts are 
covered by special legislation, in others regular 
legislation provides sufficient security for both the 
association and its members.179 Since ROSCAs 
are mainly based on trust, it has to be questioned 
how many organisers really use a kind of legal 
basis for their ROSCA. 
The hypothesis that ROSCAs have limited means 
of legal enforcement was largely confirmed by 
our empirical findings from Sri Lanka. Although 
the risk of default is minimised by a very 
confidential relationship between organiser and 
members or by means of inquiries into members, 
as described above, there is nevertheless a certain 
risk of default. Since ROSCA organisers are 
always required pay the contributions of 
defaulters or make up for delayed payments, the 
fact that they have no means of legal enforcement 
is a problem for them. Organisers are responsible 
for the proper functioning of the ROSCA, and are 
therefore required to compensate for default. 
Although most organisers stated that they do not 
perceive this as a problem, means of legal 
enforcement would provide relief for them. 
We interviewed some ROSCAs in which the 
organiser requires a certain kind of collateral or a 
guarantor to insure himself against default. 
                                                 
177 See Ardener (1964), p. 217. 
178 See Germidis / Kessler / Meghir (1991), p. 164. 
179 See Ardener (1964), p. 217. 
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However, since ROSCAs operate in the informal 
sector, they are not based on a contract, and thus 
so no legal recourse is available. It is more a 
preventive method that aims at protecting against 
default or delayed payment. 
One ROSCA member we interviewed told us that 
the organiser concerned has a method to ensure 
regular payment. This ROSCA has a kind of statute 
that is put into legal form by a lawyer. This entails 
fixing the dates for contributions and disbursement 
as well as the amounts involved. LKR 25 per day are 
charged for delayed payments. This statute not only 
protects the organiser against default, it also 
provides members with a measure of certainty that 
they will be able rely on one another. This may be a 
good example for other ROSCAs in Sri Lanka. 
Contracts would allow ROSCAs to become semi-
formalised and provide them with more effective 
means to cope with defaulters. 
In Sri Lanka, ROSCAs have been formally subject 
to legal regulation since 1936. Seetu Ordinance No. 
61 provides for registration and control of ROSCAs. 
The regulation requires every ROSCA to be formed 
by means of a written agreement between organiser 
and members. ROSCAs that operate with an amount 
below LKR 50 are exempt from this provision. This 
regulation ignores the fact that ROSCAs operate in 
the informal financial sector, and that it is their 
informality that makes them attractive for many 
people. If ROSCAs were formalised and made 
subject to official legislation, they would lose their 
informal character.180 
However, with the exception of one organiser, none 
of our interviewees had ever heard of the Seetu 
Ordinance. This interviewee stated his unwillingness 
to be registered under the law, because registration 
would entail an obligation to pay taxes. The fact that 
hardly any interviewees were familiar with the 
ordinance may indicate that it is quite unimportant to 
ROSCAs, which have no interest formalisation.181 
Nevertheless, many ROSCAs would be better off 
                                                 
180 See Fernando (1986), pp. 28-29. 
181 It is also possible that knowledge of the Act has 
decreased during the ensuing decades, and now nobody 
is familiar with it. 
Table 9: Strengths and Weakness of ROSCAs 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Low default rate 
- due to trustful relationships 
- due to inquiries about members 
No legal enforcement 
- active in informal sector 
- mainly based on knowledge of members 
Low interest rate 
- lot ROSCAs pay no interest 
- the auction mechanism results in moderate to low 
interest rates 
No long-term credits 
- credit is restricted to the duration of one cycle (13 
months)  
 
Flexibility 
- auction mechanism 
- organisers offer a variety of services that lead to 
flexibility 
- in lot ROSCAs members show mutual flexibility 
 
Low transaction costs 
- no bureaucracy 
- low transport costs 
- low information costs  
- compensation costs for defaulters are borne by the 
organisers 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation  
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operating on a contractual basis, since this would 
provide both organisers and members with 
reliable means of legal enforcement. 
Summing up the findings of our empirical 
research in Sri Lanka, we can observe that 
ROSCAs in Sri Lanka display characteristics 
similar to those analysed in the literature. Despite 
their weaknesses, ROSCAs are a very attractive 
method to obtain easy and fast credit, and one that 
forces members to save. For most of their 
members, the strengths of ROSCAs are more 
important than their weaknesses. They are 
therefore very popular in all strata of Sri Lankan 
society. Even many small entrepreneurs prefer 
ROSCAs to other sources of finance. Their incen-
tive to participate is their need to obtain credit for 
their businesses. Nevertheless, the weaknesses of 
ROSCAs cannot be denied. 
5 Conclusions and Recommendations: 
Financial System Integration 
This chapter addresses the question under study 
and summarises the study’s main results, inter-
preting them and providing recommendations on 
improving the supply of credit to SSEs. 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
In Sri Lanka, there is a gap between the credit 
supplied by both informal and formal providers to 
SSEs, which use both sources of credit depending 
on their respective conditions and purposes for 
which credit is needed. 
The Sri Lankan financial system is marked by a 
dualistic structure, i.e. the financial sector breaks 
down into formal and informal financial markets. 
In developing countries such as Sri Lanka, the 
reason why financial dualism arises is that the 
formal financial sector is underdeveloped, a fact 
which is reflected in an inadequate credit supply 
of formal financial actors, in particular banks, to 
SSEs. Informal financial suppliers partly compen-
sate for this lack of financial services. However, 
the financial services provided by informal 
suppliers are also inadequate (Table 10). 
On the one hand, formal financial actors, such as 
banks, provide relatively large credit volumes for 
long periods at moderate interest rates, but the 
procedures take time and formal collateral or 
guarantors are required. The supply of long-term 
bank credits to SSEs is thus limited. In addition, 
the supply of short-term credits by banks is 
restricted because transaction costs are high. On 
the other hand, informal financial actors, such as 
Table 10: Strengths and Weaknesses of Credit Suppliers  
Financial Needs:  Moneylender ROSCAs Banks 
Short-term credit + + ?  
Long-term credit ?  ?  + 
Small credit volume + + ?  
Larger credit volume (? ) + + 
Quick disbursement + (+) ?  
Flexible collateral + + ?  
Simple procedures + + ?  
Moderate interest rates ?  + + 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
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moneylenders and ROSCAs, provide quick and 
easily accessible credit for short periods, and these 
suppliers are more flexible as regards collateral 
requirements, though conditions are insecure and 
interest rates are high. Although the strengths and 
weaknesses of formal and informal credit 
suppliers complement each other (Table 10), 
credit needs of SSEs in Sri Lanka are not 
adequately satisfied. 
5.2 Closing the Gap 
Two approaches are available to narrow the gap. 
On the one hand, formal actors could adopt the 
strengths of informal actors as far as this is 
possible: the downscaling approach. Informal 
financial actors have certain strengths which 
formal actors could learn from in order to improve 
their credit supply for SSEs. On the other hand, 
infor-mal actors could be integrated as far as 
possible into the formal system: the modified 
upgrading approach. 
Since this gap between the formal and the infor-
mal financial sectors cannot be closed on the basis 
one of these approaches alone, a bridge has to be 
built from both sides, aimed at meeting in the 
middle and integrating the two sectors, or, in other 
words, what is called for is a combination of a 
downscaling approach and a modified up-
grading approach. The result would be a less 
strict division between the formal and informal 
markets. In addition, this would mean more com-
petition between different suppliers. The answer 
to our research question is that (at least for the 
medium-term) adequate access to credit for SSEs 
in Sri Lanka can be improved only through more 
competition between the suppliers in an integrated 
financial system. 
The following sections provide recommendations 
for closing the gap. The first part of the bridge has 
to be built from the formal sector. Recommenda-
tions to banks aim at improving their credit supply 
to SSEs. The second part of the bridge has to be 
build from the informal sector. These recommen-
dations address policy-makers and aim at an inte-
gration of the informal sector into the formal 
economy. They amount to a modified upgrading 
approach. 
5.2.1 Potentials of a Downscaling 
Approach 
In the long-term, for Sri Lanka the downscaling 
approach is more important than the upgrading  
or the linkage approach. Banks have adequate 
institutional and financial capacities to provide 
large volumes of credit for investment needs of 
SSEs. However, banks provide only a limited 
amount of loans to SSEs. In addition, most Sri 
Lankan banks have difficulties in providing small 
and short-term loans. The overhead and transac-
tion costs involved in providing small loans are 
nearly identical to those for larger loans. Conse-
quently, there is no incentive to provide small 
loans. Therefore, banks need to reduce their costs 
and increase their revenues. 
Downscaling of banks would imply that banks 
enlarge their target groups to include smaller 
clients who mainly obtain loans from informal 
suppliers of credit. In this way banks could adopt 
the strengths of informal credit suppliers. 
First of all, banks could reduce costs by simplify-
ing procedures for small loans without leaving the 
formal framework. Clearly, banks cannot operate 
as flexibly as moneylenders because they are 
obliged to abide by formal regulations and proce-
dures which imply costs. However, this does not 
mean that banks should alter their overall banking 
practice, although they could offer more schemes 
for small loans. In Sri Lanka, the process of 
downscaling has already started. The People’s 
Bank, for example, has established a microfinance 
unit and successfully implemented the Rural Banking 
Innovation Project (RBIP) programme (Box 8).  
There are a number of Sri Lankan banks, such as 
the People’s Bank, the Bank of Ceylon, the Seylan 
Bank and the Hatton National Bank, which have 
the advantage of a large network of branches and 
a broad outreach. This network could facilitate 
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downscaling of banks and could make banks more 
accessible for more clients. The People’s Bank 
and the Hatton National Bank have successfully 
used the downscaling approach. An alternative 
approach would be to introduce credit cards for 
SSEs which was done by the Seylan Bank  
(Box 9). 
Second, like moneylenders, banks could accept a 
wider range of collateral because SSEs often lack 
the collateral required to obtain regular bank 
credits. Banks could investigate what kind of  
 
items might be included as potential collateral, 
such as vehicle papers or valuable private house-
hold goods or guarantors other than civil servants 
or persons employed in public institutions. 
Third, bank officers could approach customers, as 
in the so called “Field Officer Approach,” which 
is used in the Rural Banking Innovation Project 
(RBIP) of the People’s Bank / GTZ (Box 8) and 
also by the Hatton National Bank. With this 
approach, the field officer establishes a closer 
relationship to the customer by linking the bank 
Box 8: Making Microfinance Profitable – The RBIP Project 
With an eye to refocusing the People’s Bank’s activities in lending to micro-, small, and medium-sized enterprises, the GTZ in 1996 
embarked on a co-operation project (Rural Banking Innovations Project RBIP) with the bank in Kandy. The objective of the project 
is to make these lending procedures viable for the bank and to meet the needs of customers. The programme is designed in the 
following way. 
Borrower profiles: Borrowers have to be older than 18 and younger than 55 years, permanent residents of the area in which the 
People’s Bank branch is established, should not have defaulted at the People’s Bank before, and should have a savings and an 
investment savings account with the bank. 
Enterprise profiles: Enterprises should be “viable” and operate in compliance with environmental laws 
Disbursement: Credits should be released within ten to fourteen days after application.  
Credit volume : Loans  for movable assets and working capital cannot exceed LKR 1 million. 
Borrower contribution: For a loan between LKR 25,000 and LKR 50,000, borrowers have to contribute 10 % of investments either 
in kind or in cash, and for a loan above LKR 50,000 they have to contribute 10 % of investments either in kind or in cash. 
Collateral : Credits up to LKR 25,000 require two guarantors, credits between LKR 25,000 and LKR 100,000 require two guaran-
tors and movable assets (if possible), and credits of over LKR 100,000 call for two guarantors and movable assets, or a mortgage on 
immovable assets. 
Interest rate : The interest rate amounts to 22 %. 
Repayment period: In determining the repayment period, the bank considers borrower’s the repayment capacity, but the repayment 
period should not exceed three years. In exceptional cases, borrowers are allowed to prolong the repayment period by three months. 
A repayment period of five years is possible only if immovable assets are provided as collateral. 
Field Officer Approach: By linking the bank with the client, the field officer establishes a closer relationship between these two 
actors. This approach has two objectives: first, to establish a better understanding of the clients’ financial situation and repayment 
capacity. Second, to enable the bank to expand its services to the client (marketing, business planning, management training, etc.). 
The field officer should talk to the client once or twice per month. 
Geographic Information System (GIS): The GIS is a computer-based spatial information programme. Its purpose is to improve 
services to clients and the bank’s performance, e.g. by identifying areas with a lack of banking services, establishing information 
about the bank’s market share among various target groups etc.  
Management Information System (MIS): The MIS is a widely used tool to expand the information available to make sound busi-
ness decisions. It includes information about collection ratios, portfolios at risk, trend charts, etc. Within the RBIP Project this 
instrument is linked to other tools like the GIS or impact monitoring. This makes it possible to develop a deeper understanding of 
the target market. 
Source: See Charitonenko / de Silva (2001), p. 39; Hofmann et al. (2000), pp. 2-7 ; RBIP (2001), pp. 1-2  
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more closely to the client. Banks could implement 
more personalised relations to their SSE clients 
and could better check their customers. On the 
one hand, this would lower default costs because 
banks would be better able to evaluate the finan-
cial capacity of their clients. However, on the 
other hand, this would mean higher transaction 
costs for banks. 
Fourth, banks could increase interest rates for 
small loans in order to realise profits, as is illus-
trated in the example of moneyshops (Box 10). 
The current credit supply of moneylenders shows 
that SSEs are able to pay very high interest rates 
for flexible and quick credits. 
Even though banks cannot be as flexible and as 
fast as moneylenders, they should be able to 
operate with lower interest rates than moneylend-
ers. Thus the small loan products of banks can be 
competitive as compared to moneylenders. 
Currently, there is a vast gap between money-
lenders’ interest rates and the typical interest rates 
charged by banks (typically 60-120 % p.a. 
compared to 22 % p.a.). Therefore, banks could 
more than double their interest rates for small 
loans with a view to becoming profitable. In this 
case, they would still be in a position to offer 
loans at considerably lower rates than moneylend-
ers. 
Policy-makers  could contribute to the process by 
establishing a legal framework to enable banks to 
implement the recommendations for downscaling. 
Development organisations  could promote banks 
in developing microfinance programmes. One 
successful example is the above-mentioned RBIP 
project of the GTZ and the People’s Bank. 
The history of pawnbroking in Sri Lanka (Box 11) 
and moneyshops in the Philippines (Box 10) serve 
as illustrative examples of how and where banks 
have successfully adopted lending techniques of 
informal credit suppliers. 
Box 9: The Seylan Bank’s Govisarupatha Credit 
Card for Farmers 
The Seylan Bank was the first financial institution to 
introduce the credit card in the microfinance sector. This 
card enables a farmer to purchase a specified amount of 
inputs (seeds, fertiliser, pesticides) from selected 
merchandisers. The volume of credit obtainable adapted to 
the customer’s specific needs. There is also an extra-budget 
for emergencies. The card is valid for one year and 
therefore can be used for two growing seasons. The loan 
has to be repaid before the beginning of the next season. 
Farmers who have dealt with the bank for at least nine 
month are eligible to receive the card. By introducing this 
card, the bank was able to reduce its administrative and 
operating costs. There is just one application process and 
therefore paperwork has been tangibly reduced. Interested 
farmers have to approach the bank only twice a year, 
instead of applying for each individual credit. In addition, 
this approach makes it possible for them to supplement 
their cash flow according to their needs. 
Source: Interview with the Chief Manager of the 
Development Banking Division 
Box 10: Moneyshops in the Philippines 
In 1973, the Philippine Commercial Bank and Industrial 
Bank established moneyshops at public markets. In market 
stalls these moneyshops offer daily credits at interest rates 
amounting to 40 % per annum. These interest rates were 
quite high compared with bank rates, which ranged 
between 14 to16 % in the Philippines. However, these 
interest rates are much lower than those required by 
moneylenders. Due to this additional credit supply of 
moneyshops, interest rates in these markets declined 
substantially from 20 % daily in 1973 to 5-10 % monthly 
in the early 1980s. This example illustrates that the gap 
between interest rates of formal and informal suppliers 
narrowed considerably. Between 2 and 4 persons work at 
moneyshops, daily collecting credits, as informal suppliers 
do. Contacts to customers are thus intensive: collectors 
know their clients very well and are able to evaluate their 
financial situation. Apart from lower interest rates, another 
main advantage of this approach is that it provides clients 
easy access to bank credits without complex procedures. In 
addition, moneyshops open early in the morning, when 
their customers need money. Although there was a high 
default rate, moneyshops expanded considerably in the 
Philippines. The establishment of moneyshops show that 
banks are able to adopt lending techniques of informal 
credit suppliers and that banks are able adapt their lending 
techniques to their clients’ businesses.  
Source: See ADB (1991), p. 209; Germidis / Kessler 
(1991), p. 227 
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Nevertheless, downscaling of banks (in the short- 
and medium-term) is not sufficient to provide 
adequate credit access for SSEs. 
5.2.2 Potentials of an Upgrading 
Approach 
Upgrading informal financial sector actors means 
a transformation towards more formality and 
professionalism of informal financial transactions. 
Moneylenders  have no incentives to formalise 
their businesses. The moneylenders interviewed 
were reluctant to register their moneylending 
business, since this would mean having to pay 
taxes and because registration would not mean 
any advantage to them. However, the negative 
aspects of informality suggest that a modified 
approach to upgrading moneylenders could 
contribute to a better credit supply for SSEs. 
This approach includes at least some degree of 
formalisation of moneylenders’ businesses. The 
Mediation Board, which has a mandate to settle 
loan disputes between moneylenders and their 
borrowers in a semi-formal way, is one solution to 
this problem. The Mediation Board reduces the 
moneylenders’ risk and provides more security for 
the borrower. In cases of informal loan disputes, 
mediation is possible if both parties agree to 
mediation, or if there is a written contract. 
Since the Mediation Board is not very well known 
in Sri Lanka, information on this mediation 
service should be improved. The Mediation Board 
could be promoted more extensively as an institu-
tion for the settlement of informal loan disputes. 
Sri Lankan policy-makers could promote the 
establishment of Mediation Boards throughout the 
country. 
ROSCAs  do not have much potential to upgrade 
their activities, either. The majority of ROSCA 
organisers reported that they would not be inter-
ested in a more professional approach to 
organising one or even more ROSCAs. This is 
due to the risk and responsibility involved in the 
organisation of a ROSCA. Some organisers 
perceive this responsibility as a burden and are not 
interested in upgrading their ROSCA. Similarly, 
enlargement of the group was not attractive for 
most ROSCA members. The particular social 
character of their ROSCA would suffer if too 
many people entered it. In addition, the larger the 
groups, the less foreseeable the risks and the more 
likely are delay and default. The only promising 
approach to a modified upgrading of ROSCAs 
would be to adopt some legal measures aimed at 
minimising the risks of delay and default for 
members, as well as for organisers. 
On the one hand, introduction of formal docu-
mentation for transactions in ROSCAs would 
clash with the informal nature of a ROSCA. On 
the other hand, introduction of contracts between 
members and the organiser would give the basic 
rules of ROSCAs a legal form. Such contracts 
could be used in court in cases of default to 
recover at least part of the money concerned. 
Sri Lankan policy-makers could promote a better 
legal integration of ROSCAs. Our interviews have 
shown that ROSCAs are an important instrument 
of SSE liquidity management. However, ROSCAs 
face risks of default and fraud despite the trust-
based and personal relations that generally reduce 
Box 11: Pawnbroking in Sri Lanka 
In the first half of the 20 th century pawnbroking was a purely 
informal business. However, today two types of formal actors 
dominate the business, with informal pawnbrokers remaining 
only a marginal phenomenon. First, there are pawning centres 
of banks, which started out by copying the techniques of 
pawnbrokers. They charge much lower interest rates than 
informal pawnbrokers and offer legal security. Second, there 
are licensed pawnbrokers. These are mostly jewellers who 
obtain an official license for pawning and offer pawning 
services to their clients which are more flexible (higher credits 
for an item and longer opening hours) and faster than the those 
offered by banks. However, these pawnbrokers demand higher 
interest rates. On the one hand, both types of pawnbrokers act 
within the legal system. On the other hand, the main advantage 
of pawnbroking is low transaction costs for both the borrower 
and the lender, e.g. such transactions usually take about five 
minutes. In addition, they also make available small credits at 
relatively low interest rates. 
Source: See Grashof (2002) 
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the chance of default. Due to lack of legal en-
forceability, loss in cases of default may be high. 
5.2.3 Potentials of a Linkage Approach 
According to our analysis, the linkage approach 
appears unsuitable to improving the access of 
SSEs to credit. The linkage approach consists of 
linking informal or semi-formal financial actors 
with formal institutions, i.e. of co-operation 
between informal and formal actors. This makes it 
possible for them to complement their respective 
strengths and improve services to their clients. 
Since in Sri Lanka the most important informal 
credit suppliers are moneylenders and ROSCAs, 
linkage of these two credit suppliers with banks 
will be analysed. 
In theory, linkage between moneylenders and 
banks appears to be an appropriate solution182, but 
in practice it is difficult to realise, a fact which is 
illustrated in Box 12. Even if the approach is 
designed in a more market-oriented manner, the 
following critical issues have to be taken into 
consideration. 
First, moneylenders in Sri Lanka already have 
access to other sources of credit. Accordingly, any 
linkage approach would have to compete with 
these sources, especially in terms of flexibility of 
conditions and quick availability. Second, it is 
questionable whether such linkage would lead to 
an increase of the credit supplied by moneylend-
ers to SSEs, because the bank is unable to monitor 
whether moneylenders in fact use bank credits to 
provide credits or the persons to whom money-
lenders lend on these additional credits. In the late 
1980s the Bank of Ceylon launched a scheme 
aimed at linking moneylenders and banks in Sri 
Lanka failed (Box 12). 
Similarly, the potential for linking ROSCAs with 
banks is low. The majority of the ROSCAs inter-
viewed are not social self-help groups but 
autonomous associations whose main purpose is 
                                                 
182 See Germidis / Kessler / Meghir (1991), p. 236. 
group lending and saving, which appear to func-
tion well. Thus the demand for a linkage approach 
is low. The main argument for linking self-help 
groups with financial NGOs and banks is to 
enlarge both funds and the credit supply of par-
ticipants. Since borrowers in Sri Lanka have a 
wide range potential of credit sources, this major 
argument for linkage is not valid for Sri Lanka. 
Measures to Adjust the Legal and Institutional 
Framework 
In addition to these approaches, the legal and 
institutional framework could be adjusted. Due to 
their lack of adequate collateral, SSEs often 
cannot obtain large volumes of credit from banks. 
To improve this situation, assets of SSEs could be 
formalised. In particular, SSEs cannot use land 
properties as collateral because there are no clear 
regulations on how to prove property rights, and 
land titles are not registered. Although solving this 
problem would amount to a time-consuming and 
costly process, policy-makers should promote the 
registration of land titles. 
Since SSEs are often highly indebted, the 
following steps could be used to avoid high SEE 
indebtedness or to help solve the problems of 
highly indebted SSEs. First, policy-makers could 
establish an advisory board for highly indebted 
SSEs. Second, policy-makers could support a fair 
and transparent insolvency process for SSEs by 
building a semi-formal institution which regulates 
insolvency processes. SSEs which use new loans 
to service outstanding loans need to break out of 
this circle, which is their only chance to start out 
again with a new business. 
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Box 12: Linking Moneylenders and Banks in Sri Lanka 
In 1988, the Bank of Ceylon tried to establish a scheme to improve the credit supply in rural financial markets in co-operation 
with moneylenders. The objectives were to lower administrative and transaction costs for the bank, to reduce interest rates in 
informal lending and to help the poor. The bank’s approach consisted of three steps: First, to select “Community Credit Facili-
tators” (CCFs), second, to establish separate current accounts with certain overdraft limits for CCFs and third, to monitor their 
performance.  
Selection of CCFs was based on certain eligibility criteria. For example, a CCF had to have a current account at the Bank of 
Ceylon and had to provide collateral. Furthermore, he or she must not have defaulted on previous loans. At the same time, the 
CCF had to have previous experience in informal lending, and be able to conduct simple accounting and “command respect.” 
Each division of the regional structure had to select a maximum of three CCFs. Before the separate current account was 
established, the bank calculated the overdraft limit on the basis of the CCF’s collateral. Once the Bank opened the account, the 
moneylender could obtain money within the limits of his overdraft for on-lending. The interest rate was 18 % p.a.  
Criteria for reviewing the moneylender’s activities included the nature of his collateral, fluctuations in his overdraft and guide-
lines describing the functions and responsibilities of CCFs. If the result of the review was positive, the overdraft limit was 
renewed; if not, it was reduced. The guidelines mainly described the desired activities of CCFs. They were to provide quick 
credit with low formal barriers in small doses to the poor in order to reach a maximum number of borrowers. In addition, they 
were to encourage productive borrowing, to demand “a more reasonable rate of interest” and “ to maintain secrecy [...] in order 
to preserve the client’s reputation and dignity.” The only guideline concerning the relationship with the Bank of Ceylon was that 
it was to bear the full credit risk. 
The results of this linkage were disappointing, and the objectives were not met. An analysis of the failure can provide a clearer 
idea about the appropriate design and necessary conditions for a linkage approach with moneylenders. First, the Sri Lankan 
approach relies on a mechanism setting standards for moneylenders. Setting standards is problematic if the formal financial 
provider cannot control these standards. In addition, it is difficult to set standards in line with market conditions. In this case the 
bank was not able to monitor the moneylenders, who regarded the funds as their own money. As a result, the funds were 
“misused” for investments rather than for extending microcredits. The underlying problem was that the funds were subsidised. 
Moreover, even if moneylenders had increased their lending activity, it is unlikely that they would have passed on the subsidy. 
The goal of “a more reasonable interest rate” cannot be achieved by subsidies.  
Second, the situation was aggravated by the political backing of some moneylenders. Knowing that they would not be forced to 
repay the funds, they were not obliged to abide by the stipulations agreed upon with the bank. Third, the goal of “  maintain[ing] 
secrecy[...] in order to preserve the client’s reputation and dignity” is a laudable one. However, social pressure is one important 
mechanism used by moneylenders to sanction default and to realise high repayment ratios. There is a trade-off here between 
social and economic goals. Fourth, development of competition depends very much on how many moneylenders are eligible for 
funds from a formal financial institution. Concerning this issue, there is a trade-off between increased costs for dealing with 
many moneylenders and the danger of creating monopolies by dealing only with a very limited number of moneylenders. The 
optimal solution will depend on specific market conditions. 
Source: See Bank of Ceylon (1988) 
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6 Research Design 
6.1 Research Area 
Figure A 1: Map of the Negombo Area 
 
Figure A 2: Map of the Nuwara Eliya Area 
 
Source: RBIP Kandy 
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6.2 Schedule of Field Research 
The schedule of the field research in Sri Lanka was as follows: 
17.02.-18.02.02 Colombo: meeting with People’s Bank, German Embassy, GTZ 
19.02.-01.03.02 Kandy: presentation of the preliminary report, pre-tests of questionnaires and adaptation 
02.03.-16.03.02 Negombo: interviews in the field and a short evaluation of interviews 
17.03-31.03.02 Nuwara Eliya/Maskeliya: interviews in the field and a short evaluation of interviews 
01.04.-28.04.02 Evaluation of interviews, expert-interviews, writing of final report 
29.04.-04.05.02 Presentation of results to counterparts and experts as well as discussion of input from the 
workshop 
6.3 List of Expert-Interviews  
Having interviewed the practitioners, we also interviewed some Sri Lankan and international experts, 
especially branch managers of banks and experts working in research departments of Sri Lankan banks, 
national and international research institutes and members of the donor community active in the field of 
financial development. Furthermore, we interviewed some NGOs involved in microfinance. 
 
Mr. Udo Gärtner GTZ 
Project manager EIP (Enterprise Information Project) 
Dr. Nimal Sanderatne  University of Peradeniya 
Visiting Senior Fellow, Postgraduate Institute of 
Agriculture 
Mrs. Shenuka Chanmugan  Asian Development Bank, Colombo 
Mr. Chandrarathna, D. Vithanage The Ceylon Chamber of Commerce 
Assistant Secretary General Programme Manager 
Mr. Sarath Hewagama Sarvodaya Economic Enterprise Development Services 
(SEEDS) 
Chairman 
Mr. Saliya J. Ranasinghe  Sarvodaya Economic Enterprise Development Services 
(SEEDS) 
Chief Executive  
Mr. Sikila Wijewardena Sarvodaya Economic Enterprise Development Services 
(SEEDS) 
Deputy Managing Director 
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H. M. Ranasinghe  Small & Medium Enterprise Developers (SMED) 
Project Manager Management Service Division 
Mr. Dulan De Silva Consultant 
Prof. M.D.C. Abhayaratna University of Sri Jayewardenepura, Colombo 
Department of Geography 
Mr. D. V. Sonnadura Industrial Development Board 
Director 
Mrs. Amara Liyanage Industrial Development Board 
Assistant Director 
Mr. W.M. Rathnayake  Industrial Development Board 
District Manager Nuwara Eliya 
Mr. Mervin Perera 
 
People’s Bank Branch Manager, Negombo 
Mr. Karunatilake Business Promotion Officer (BPO) of the People’s 
Bank, Maskeliya 
Mr. Ranasinghe  People’s Bank, Kandy 
Mr. Sumane Rathnasuriya Seylan Bank 
Chief Manager, Develpment Banking Department 
Mr. M.H.M. Razik Hatton National Bank, Kandy 
Mr. D. Wijesundera Hatton National Bank 
Senior Deputy General Manager (Development 
Banking) 
Mr. Richard Gant Consultant 
Mr. Gunaratne  Mediation Board 
Maskeliya 
Dr. Hemamali Palihakkara SANASA 
Director General SANASA Education Campus 
Mr. T. B. Weerasekara 
Ministry of Industries 
Chairman of Industrial Development Authority 
Mr. Lionel Jayaratne  U.S. Agency for International Development  
Mission to Sri Lanka  
Senior Project Management Specialist 
 
